Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU Member States - A study of the case law from the European Court of Justice on access to national courts for non-governmental organizations and the costs of environmental proceedings by Hjalmarsson, Karin
	  
 
	  
 
 
FACULTY	  OF	  LAW	  
Lund	  University	  
	  
	  
	  
Karin	  Hjalmarsson	  
	  
	  
Access	  to	  Justice	  in	  Environmental	  Matters	  in	  
the	  EU	  Member	  States	  
	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  case	  law	  from	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  	  
on	  access	  to	  national	  courts	  for	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  	  
and	  the	  costs	  of	  environmental	  proceedings	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
JURM02	  Graduate	  Thesis	  
	  
Graduate	  Thesis,	  Master	  of	  Laws	  programme	  
30	  higher	  education	  credits	  
	  
	  
Supervisor:	  Sanja	  Bogojevic	  
	  
Semester:	  VT	  2014	  
 
Contents 
SUMMARY 1	  
SAMMANFATTNING 3	  
PREFACE 5	  
ABBREVIATIONS 6	  
1 INTRODUCTION 7	  
1.1	   Background 7	  
1.2	   Access to justice in environmental matters 8	  
1.3	   Reseach questions 11	  
1.4	   Structure 11	  
1.5	   Methods and materials 12	  
1.6	   Delimitations 13	  
2	   THE AARHUS CONVENTION 15	  
2.1	   Definitions 15	  
2.2	   Access to justice 16	  
2.3	   The role of environmental NGOs 17	  
2.4	   The EU implementation of the Aarhus Convention 18	  
2.4.1	   The Aarhus Regulation 19	  
2.4.2	   The Directives 20	  
2.4.3	   The proposed Directive on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 20	  
2.5	   Direct effect? 23	  
2.6	   Concluding remarks 25	  
3	   CORRESPONDING PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 26	  
3.1	   The principle of procedural autonomy 26	  
3.2	   The principle of effective judicial protection 28	  
3.3	   The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 29	  
3.4	   Concluding remarks 31	  
4	   CASE LAW FROM THE EUROPREAN COURT OF JUSTICE 32	  
4.1	   The role of environmental NGOs 32	  
4.1.1	   Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening 32	  
4.1.2	   Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen 34	  
4.1.3	   Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK 35	  
4.1.4	   Comment 36	  
4.2	   The costs of environmental proceedings 41	  
4.2.1	   Commission v Ireland 42	  
4.2.2	   Edwards and Pallikaropoulos 43	  
4.2.3	   Commission v United Kingdom 44	  
4.2.4	   Comment 46	  
4.3	   Concluding remarks 49	  
5 ANALYSIS 50	  
6 CONCLUSION 54	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55	  
TABLE OF CASES 60	  
LEGISLATION 63	  
 
 1 
Summary 
The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on 
access to information, public participation in decision-making, access to 
justice in environmental matters (hereafter the Aarhus Convention) is 
considered to be the main legally binding instrument protecting the public’s 
environmental rights. It is based on the idea that procedural rights relating to 
environmental matters should contribute to the protection of the right of 
every person, including future generations, to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health and well-being. Access to justice in 
environmental matters is of significant importance as it may add to the 
protection of public environmental interests, enforce the implementation of 
existing environmental laws, and increase the legitimacy of environmental 
decisions. As the environment has no voice of its own it has been argued 
that for instance Non-Governmental Organizations (hereafter NGOs), 
should be granted access to court in order to speak on behalf of the 
environment.  
 
Both the EU and the Member States are part of the Aarhus Convention, and 
the aim of this thesis is to examine the CJEU’s interpretation of access to 
justice in environmental matters at EU Member State level. The first 
question investigated is how the CJEU interprets the national standing 
requirements for environmental NGOs. Additionally, the CJEU's rulings on 
questions concerning the allowed costs of judicial national proceedings are 
examined, as high litigation costs may be an indirect hinder to access to 
justice. Moreover, the thesis also aims to study the rational behind granting 
wide access to justice in environmental matters, in particular for 
environmental NGOs in the EU Member States. Lastly, this thesis will cast 
light on the question whether there is a need for the EU legislator to 
harmonise the right to access to justice on environmental matters.    
 
It is clear from the examination that the EU’s and the Member States’ 
implementation of, and compliance with, the Aarhus Convention has not 
been unproblematic. In fact, there have been several legal ambiguities both 
regarding the EU legal order and the internal legal order of numerous EU 
Member States. For example when EU became part of the Aarhus 
convention there were discussions regarding the construction of a directive 
on access to justice in environmental matters, but as the Member States 
opposed this idea due to the principle of subsidiarity the directive was never 
finalized. Furthermore, access to justice in environmental matters still varies 
throughout the Union, and in several of the Member states there are a 
number of barriers potential applicants have to overcome.  
 
The conclusion drawn from analysing the judgements delivered by the 
CJEU, is that the Court has taken a progressive approach and played a key 
role regarding the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention, and the relevant 
EU legislation. Of particular importance is the fact that the CJEU, while 
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interpreting the Member States’ standing rules for Non-Governmental 
Organisations in environmental matters, has highlighted the role of these 
organisations and emphasized that they should enjoy wide access to justice. 
Regarding the allowed costs of environmental proceedings, the CJEU has 
concluded that the costs must be examined in the light of the objective of 
the Aarhus Convention to establish wide access to justice in environmental 
matters. Consequently, these judgements may increase the ability for 
environmental NGOs to take action in national courts on behalf of the 
environment.  
 
Nevertheless, there are still issues regarding access to justice in 
environmental matters that need to be resolved. In order to enforce EU 
environmental legislation and achieve legal certainty throughout the Union, 
the conclusion drawn in this thesis, is that there should be harmonizing 
measures taken by the EU legislator in order to guarantee access to justice in 
environmental matters in the EU Member States.  
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Sammanfattning 
Förenta Nationernas Ekonomiska Kommission för Europas Konvention om 
tillgång till information, allmänhetens deltagande i beslutsprocesser och 
tillgång till rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor (Århuskonventionen) anses vara 
det essentiella rättsligt bindande instrumentet för skyddet av allmänhetens 
miljörelaterade rättigheter. Konventionen bygger på uppfattningen att 
processuella rättigheter i samband med miljöfrågor kan bidra till att skydda 
rätten för varje person, inklusive framtida generationer, att leva i en miljö 
som är förenlig med hälsa och välbefinnande. Tillgång till rättslig prövning i 
miljöfrågor är av stor betydelse eftersom det kan bidra till att öka skyddet 
för allmänna miljöintressen, verkställa genomförandet av befintliga 
miljölagar, och öka miljöbesluts legitimitet. Eftersom miljön inte har någon 
möjlighet att själv väcka talan har det hävdats att till exempel 
miljöorganisationer bör ges möjlighet att ha talerätt i miljöfrågor. 
 
Både EU och medlemsstaterna är part till Århuskonventionen, och syftet 
med denna uppsats är att undersöka EU-domstolens tolkning av tillgång till 
rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor i EU- medlemsstaterna. Den första frågan 
som undersöks är hur EU-domstolen tolkar de nationella talerättsreglerna 
för miljöorganisationer. Vidare undersöks EU-domstolens avgöranden i 
frågor som rör de tillåtna processkostnaderna för prövning i miljöfrågor, 
eftersom höga processkostnader kan utgöra ett indirekt hinder för tillgången 
till rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor. Därutöver utreds syftet med att ge 
miljöorganisationer en omfattande rätt till rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor i 
EU: s medlemsstater. Slutligen avser uppsatsen att bringa klarhet i frågan 
om det finns ett behov av att EU: s lagstiftaren harmoniserar rätten till 
rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor på medlemsstatsnivå. 
 
Det framgår av uppsatsen att EU:s och medlemsstaternas införlivande, och 
efterlevnad, av Århuskonventionen inte har varit oproblematisk. I själva 
verket har det funnits flera rättsliga oklarheter både vad gäller EU: s 
rättsordning och den interna rättsordningen i många av medlemsstaterna. 
Exempelvis pågick diskussioner om att utarbeta ett direktiv om rätten att få 
tillgång till rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor när EU blev part till 
Århuskonventionen, men eftersom medlemsstaterna motsatte sig detta på 
grund av subsidiaritetsprincipen verkställdes det inte. Därtill varierar rätten 
att få tillgång till rättslig prövning i miljöfrågor fortfarande i EU, och i flera 
av medlemsstaterna finns det ett flertal hinder potentiella klaganden måste 
övervinna. 
 
Analysen av rättsfallen visar att EU-domstolen har haft ett progressivt 
tillvägagångssätt, och därmed spelat en nyckelroll avseende tolkningen av 
Århuskonventionen och relevant EU lagstiftning. Framför allt har EU-
domstolen, vid tolkningen av medlemsstaternas talerättsregler för 
Miljöorganisation, uppmärksammat betydelsen av dessa organisationers 
medverkan i miljöfrågor och betonat att de bör ha vid talerätt. Gällande 
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kostnaderna för domstolsförfaranden i miljöärenden, konstaterade EU-
domstolen att kostnaderna måste prövas mot bakgrund av 
Århuskonventionens syfte att upprätta en omfattande möjlighet till rättslig 
prövning i miljöfrågor. Följaktligen kan dessa domar vidga möjligheten för 
miljöorganisationer att väcka talan vid nationella domstolar. 
 
Trots detta finns det fortfarande frågor som behöver lösas avseende 
möjlighet att ha tillgång till rättsprövning i miljöfrågor. För att förstärka 
EU:s miljölagstiftning och uppnå rättssäkerhet i hela Unionen är den slutsats 
som dras i denna uppsats att det finns ett behov av harmoniseringsåtgärder 
från EU-lagstiftarens sida för att garantera rätten till domstolsprövning i 
miljöfrågor i EU:s medlemsstater.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In the 10th principle of the Rio Declaration from 1992 it was established that 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice constitute core principles of environmental protection.1 This 
acknowledgment became the foundation of the United Nation Economic 
Commission for Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participating in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters, adopted in June 1998 in Aarhus, (hereafter the Aarhus 
Convention).2 The Convention is considered to be the main legally binding 
instrument protecting the public’s environmental rights.3 It is based on the 
idea that procedural rights relating to environmental matters should 
contribute to the protection of the right of every person, including future 
generations, to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-
being.4 It is important to underline the fact that the Convention does not 
create a substantive right to a healthy environment; instead it is focused on 
forming procedural rights relating to the concept.5 The main purpose of the 
convention is to engage the civil society in the environmental policy-making 
process in order to increase its democratic nature and legitimacy.6 Likewise, 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice are central to ensure the legitimacy and effective operation of a 
democratic government, as well as crucial for safeguarding human rights 
and protecting the environment.7 In fact, it has been stated in the doctrine 
that denial of procedural rights in environmental matters, both endangers the 
protection of substantive human rights and upsurges the probability of 
“irreversible environmental degradation.”8 
 
 
                                                
1 The Rio Declaration UN Doc. A/CONF/151/5/Rev.1 
2 United Nation Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, 
public participation in decision-making, access to justice in environmental matters (adopted 
25 July 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001) 2161 UNTS 447 (the Aarhus 
Convention) 
3 Pánovics A, The need for an EU-directive on access to justice in environmental matters, 
147 Studia luridica auctoritate Universitatis Pecs, Budapest, 2010, at 136 (Pánovics) 
4  The Aarhus Convention, supra note 2 at Article 1 
5 Pánovics (2010) supra note 3 at 140 
6 Pallemaerts M, The Aarhus Convention at ten – interactions and tensions between 
convention international law and EU environmental law, Europa Law publishing, 2011, at 3 
(Pallemaerts) 
7 Bisman A, The violence of silence: some reflections on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in matters concerning the 
environment, Crime Law Soc. Change, 2013, at 292 (Bisman) 
8 Hunter D, International environmental law and policy, 4. ed., Foundation Press, 2011, at 
1336 
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The Commission, on behalf of the European Union (hereafter EU), first 
signed the Aarhus Convention in 1998, and through a Council decision on 
17 February 2005 the Convention was concluded.9 It is stated in the 
preamble of this decision that the objectives of the Aarhus Convention are 
“consistent with the objectives of the Community’s environmental policy, 
listed in Article 174 of the Treaty, (now article 191 in the Treaty of the 
functioning of the European Union) pursuant to which the Community, 
which shares competence with its Member States, has already adopted a 
comprehensive set of legislation which is evolving and contributes to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Convention, not only by its own 
institutions, but also by public authorities in its Member States.”10 Since 
environmental policy is a shared competence, as noted above, the Member 
States are also parties to the Convention and therefore it is a mixed 
agreement.11  
 
1.2 Access to justice in environmental 
matters 
The focus of this thesis is laid upon what is said to be the most controversial 
part of the Convention, namely access to justice in environmental matters.12 
This specific right is of importance for three reasons. First; it may add to the 
protection of public environmental interests, second; the existing 
environmental laws can be more efficiently implemented, third; the 
expanded possibility for challenging environmental decisions before courts 
may increase the public acceptance and the overall accuracy of the decisions 
in question, and thereby increasing their legitimacy. 13 In fact, as argued in 
the doctrine “the legitimacy of law depends on the procedures and 
involvement of the public in the adaptation as well as the application of 
legal norms”.14  
 
The preamble of the Aarhus Convention states that effective judicial 
mechanisms should be accessible to the public, including organisations, in 
order to protect legitimate interests, and enable environmental law to be 
enforced. The provisions on access to justice in environmental matters in the 
Aarhus Convention are based on the presumption that the natural 
environment belongs to all of us, as well as the responsibility to prevent 
                                                
9 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the 
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, (2005) OJ L 124/1 
(Decision 2005/370/EC) 
10 Ibid., at recital 7 in the preamble 
11 According to Article 4 TFEU, which is also reflected in Article 191(4) TFEU regarding 
external relations, and it follows from Article 216(2) TFEU that it is binding upon the 
community institutions as well as the Member States. 
12 Pallemaerts (2011) supra note 6, at 13 
13 Ebbesson J, (red.), Access to justice in environmental matters in the EU = Accès à la 
justice en matière d'environnement dans l'UE, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002, at 7 (Ebbesson) 
14 Ibid., at 7 
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environmental damage.15 Since breaches of environmental law tend to be of 
concern for the population as a whole without any particular person having 
a significant personal concern, it is often very difficult to enforce 
environmental law based on the traditional rules of locus standi.16 As 
Christopher Stone expressed it already in 1972; the mere fact that the 
environment has no voice of its own should not deprive it from having legal 
rights.17 Accordingly, a guardian, for instance a Non-Governmental 
Organization (hereafter NGO), should be enabled to have standing in order 
to speak on behalf of the environment.18  The Aarhus Convention has 
brought novel solutions to governance problems relating to environmental 
protection, by highlighting the role of the citizens and NGOs promoting 
environmental protection, by increasing their ability to take action in 
court.19 Moreover, as the costs of the proceedings might compose an 
indirect access to court, the Convention proclaims that the costs of 
environmental proceedings may not be prohibitively expensive.20  
 
Access to justice is believed to be crucial for environmental protection, as 
environmental law tends to suffer from an enforcement deficit due to several 
varying reasons; from the inability to the unwillingness for national 
governments to implement the legislation in a sufficient manner, and the 
fact that the majority of environmental law does not confer rights on 
individuals that can be invoked in court.21 Regarding EU environmental 
law, the European Commission has stated that the main reason why this 
legislation is less fully enforced, compared to laws concerning for instance 
the internal market, is the lack of financial motivation in environmental 
protection cases.22 Moreover, from the Union perspective, the functioning of 
the internal market may be distorted if environmental laws are not fully 
enforced, as this creates unequal terms of economic competition throughout 
the Union, depending on the concerned Member State, which might give 
economic operators that do not comply with their obligations an economic 
advantage over those that respect the environmental legislation.23 To 
counteract this tendency, and enforce environmental protection, the EU 
Commissioner for the environment Janez Potočnik has stated that the 
                                                
15 AG Sharpston opinion in Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening 
(2009) para. 59  
16 Oliver P, Access to information and justice in EU environmental law: The Aarhus 
Convention, Fordham International Law Journal 2013, at 1431 (Oliver) 
17 Stone C D, (2010). Should trees have standing? law, morality, and the environment. 3rd 
ed. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, at 1-31 
18 Ibid., 1-31 
19 Oliver (2013) supra note 16, at 1469 
20 The Aarhus Convention, supra note 2 at Article 9(4) 
21 Zengerling C, Greening International Jurisprudence: Environmental NGOs before 
International Courts, Tribunals, and Compliance Committees (2013). Leiden: BRILL, at 2 
22 Commission of the European communities, Proposal for a Directive on access to justice 
in environmental matters, COM (2003) at 624  
23 Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum 1.1 
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environment must be seen as a public good, and be supported by a public 
voice.24  
 
Regarding the EU Member States’ application of the Aarhus Convention, 
the national compliance reports that have been submitted to the Aarhus 
Compliance Committee have shown that several countries have changed 
their legislation in order to be in line with the Arhus convention, and the EU 
implementation of it.25 Although the Convention itself does not give 
standing rights, which will be further discussed in the next chapter, it has in 
fact influenced the national standing rules. Nevertheless, the right to access 
to justice in environmental matters still tends to vary throughout the Union, 
due to for example the different legal cultures,26 and the inaction from the 
EU legislator, which will be discussed in further detail in chapter two.27 In 
particular, the standing requirements for environmental NGOs as well as the 
costs of the proceedings, which indirect affect the accessibility of the courts, 
differ between the countries.28 In fact, “the cost of the judicial procedures is 
considered to be an obstacle to environmental justice – or at least to have a 
dissuasive effect thereupon”, in the majority of the EU Member States.29 
Due to the hurdles individuals and environmental NGOs have to overcome 
in order to access the national courts in several Member States, it has been 
argued in the doctrine that “the weak enforcement of EU environmental law 
is deemed to be one of the main weaknesses of environmental protection 
within the EU”.30 Therefore, the focus in the following presentation will be 
put on how these issues have been addressed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereafter CJEU). Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to 
examine the right to access to justice in environmental matters at EU 
Member State level, in the light of the Aarhus Convention, according to 
judgements delivered by the CJEU.  
 
                                                
24 SPEECH712/856 Potočnik J, ”The fish cannot go to Court” – the environment is a public 
good that must be supported by a public voice, European Commission, 23/11/2012 at 5 
(SPEECH Potočnik) 
25 Jans J H, Judicial Dialogue, Judicial Competition and Global environmental law – a case 
study on the UNECE Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental matters, in Jans J.H, Marcory R, Moreno 
Molina A-M, National courts and EU environmental law, Europa Lw publishing, 2013, at 
151 (Jans, Judicial Dialogue) 
26 Faure M, Philipsen N, Backes C, Choukroune L, Fernhout F, Mühl M G, Final Report, 
Possible initiatives on Access to justice in Environmental Matters and their socio-economic 
implications, Maastricht University Faculty of Law, Metro Institute, 9 January 2013 (Faure 
et al.) 
27 COM(2003) 624 final, supra note 22 
28 Därpö J, Effective justice? Synthesis of the report of the study on the implementation of 
Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in the member States of the European Union, 
2013-10-11/Final at 3-15 (Därpö) 
29 Ibid., at 21 
30 De Sadeleer N, Enforcing EUCHR Principles and fundamental rights in environmental 
cases, Nordic Journal of International law 81 (2012) at 58  
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1.3 Reseach questions 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the CJEU’s interpretation of access to 
justice in environmental matters at EU Member State level. The two main 
questions investigated are; first, how does the CJEU interpret the national 
standing requirements for environmental NGOs, and second, what are the 
implications of CJEU’s reasoning concerning the rule that environmental 
proceedings may not be prohibitively expensive. It should be underlined that 
the purpose is not to examine the national standing rules as such; instead the 
focus is put on the CJEU’s interpretation of the national standing 
requirements in light of the Aarhus Convention and the Aarhus Regulation. 
Moreover, CJEU's rulings on questions concerning the allowed costs of 
judicial national proceedings are also investigated, as high litigation costs 
may be an indirect hinder to access to justice. Related, sub-questions include 
investigating how the CJEU interprets the right to access to justice in 
environmental matters at Member State level, which legal base it uses in 
such instances, examining also the implications thereof.  With that in mind, 
the thesis also aims at examining the rational behind granting wide access to 
justice in environmental matters, in particular for environmental NGOs, in 
the EU Member States. Lastly, this thesis will cast light on the question 
whether there is a need for EU legislators to harmonise the right to access to 
justice on environmental matters.    
 
1.4 Structure 
In order to set out the context of the analysis of the case law delivered by 
the CJEU concerning the right to access to justice in environmental matters 
at EU Member State level, this thesis will commence with a presentation of 
the legal basis of these judgements. First, the Aarhus Convention will be 
examined, since the standing requirements as well as the costs provisions, 
originally derive from it. In particular, the role of environmental NGOs 
according to the Convention will be examined. This will be followed by a 
presentation on how these provisions have been implemented into Union 
law, namely via the Aarhus Regulation and the Directive on public 
participation31 as well as the Directive on access to information.32 This will 
be followed by an examination of the current state of the debate on whether 
there is a need of a Directive on access to justice in environmental matters. 
Lastly, the question on the possibility of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention to have direct effect will be discussed.  
 
                                                
31 Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of 
certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to 
public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC 
(2003) OJ L156/17 (Directive 2003/35/EC) 
32 Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information and repealing 
Council Directive 90/313/EEC (2003) OJ L41/27 
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The purpose of the next chapter is to give an overview of the right to an 
effective judicial protection as well as the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence in relation to the principle of procedural autonomy, and how 
this might interact with the rights originated from the Aarhus Convention. 
This is done in order to comprehend the reasoning of the Court in the case 
law presented in chapter four. In this regard, especially the European 
Charter of fundamental rights (hereafter the Charter) with focus on Article 
47 the right to an effective remedy is of importance.  
 
The fourth chapter aims to investigate how the CJEU has interpreted 
national standing rules for environmental NGOs in the light of the Aarhus 
Convention, and the relevant EU legislation implementing its provisions. 
The purpose is not to examine the case law only dealing with standing 
requirements as such, but also the cases concerning the cost of litigation as 
this has an indirect effect on the accessibility to court, especially for the 
smaller NGOs. The first part of the case law presentation concerns the core 
of this thesis, namely the right to access for environmental NGOs. The aim 
is not to examine standing for NGOs per se but how the CJEU interprets 
national laws on standing for environmental NGOs. This will be followed 
by a concluding analysis of the judgements where the opinions delivered by 
Advocate General Sharpston will be taken into account. Afterwards, the 
case law concerning the costs of the proceedings will be presented, 
concluded by an analysis including references to the opinions delivered by 
Advocate General Kokott. Thereafter, a conclusion on the effects and 
outcomes of the judgements will be given.  
 
The fifth chapter constitutes a concluding analysis on the right of access to 
justice at EU Member State level, in the light of the Aarhus Convention and 
relevant EU law, based on the examined judgements. Afterwards, the 
rational behind granting wide access to justice in environmental matters, in 
particular for environmental NGOs, in the EU Member States, will be 
examined. This will begin with an examination of the arguments put 
forward in the doctrine as well as by the EU institutions. Next, the reasoning 
of the Court in this matter will be taken into account. The analysis will end 
with a discussion on the plausible effect and actual outcome of the 
examined case law, steering towards the question whether there is a need of 
further clarification on this matter from the Court, or harmonizing measures 
from the EU legislator. Lastly, in the sixth chapter a conclusion of the thesis 
will be given. 
 
1.5 Methods and materials 
The method used is traditional legal theory, meaning the focus has been put 
on examining the relevant legislation, doctrine and, in particular, the case 
law from the CJEU. The given starting point of this thesis has been the 
Aarhus Convention, in particular Article 9 concerning the right to access to 
justice in environmental matters. As other provisions of the convention is of 
importance for the scope of this thesis, both regarding the role of NGOs and 
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the cost of litigation, these have been taken into account as well. Moreover, 
the EU implementation of the Convention has been an important basis for 
this study, namely the Aarhus Regulation,33 Directive 2003/4/EC on public 
access to environmental information, Directive 2003/35 on public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes 
relating to the environment amending the EIA and the IPPC Directive, as 
well as the proposed Directive on access to justice in environmental matters.  
 
In order to present different points of views several studies carried out on 
access to justice in environmental matters in the EU Member States, as well 
as speeches, and a broad range of books and articles from legal scholars 
have been used. Of particular importance, has been the Synthesis report of 
the study, ordered by the EU Commission, on the implementation of Article 
9(3) and 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention in the Member States of the 
European Union,34 as it provides useful, and updated insights, relevant for 
the scope of this thesis. The main basis, however, is the case law concerning 
the right to access to justice in environmental matters at EU Member State 
level developed by the CJEU. The central judgements analysed concern the 
issues of standing for non-governmental organisations promoting 
environmental protection, and the rule that environmental procedures cannot 
be prohibitively expensive. 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the European Union will consequently be 
referred to as EU or the Union and references to the treaties of the Union 
will be constructed after the Treaty of the European Union (hereafter TEU) 
and the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU). 
When referring to former treaty legislation, a reference will be made to the 
relevant provisions in the current legislation. 
 
1.6 Delimitations 
The focus of this thesis is put on access to justice to the national courts in 
environmental matters, in the light of the Aarhus Convention, according to 
the CJEU. Therefore, the case law concerning access directly to the CJEU 
through Article 263(4) TFEU will not be examined. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the CJEU has been restrictive when granting direct access to 
the Union courts in challenges towards the EU institutions via Article 
263(4).35 
 
                                                
33 Regulation 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters to Community Institutions and bodies, (2006) OJ L264/13 
(Regulation 1367/2006) 
34 Därpö (2013) supra note 28  
35 For example Case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace (1998) ECR 1-1651, Case C-263/02 
P Jégo Quéré v Commiccion (2004) ECR I-3425, Case C-50/00 P Union de pequeños 
agricultores v Council (2002) ECR 1-6677. 
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Moreover, environmental directives enabling individuals to directly rely on 
them in order to have access to justice in environmental matters, and where 
these provisions do not originate from the Aarhus Convention, will not be 
considered.36 In addition to this, it should be pointed out that the CJEU has 
handled down several more judgements than the ones contained in this 
presentation, regarding the right to access to justice in environmental 
matters at EU Member State level, where the Court has interpreted the 
Aarhus Convention and the EU implementation of it. Nevertheless, as these 
judgements do not concern access to justice for environmental NGOs, or the 
costs of the proceedings, they fall outside the scope of this thesis. It could be 
argued that the case law concerning individuals’ right to access to justice in 
environmental matters might influence environmental NGOs standing 
rights, but in order to centre the research and thereby provide a more in-
depth analysis, these judgements will not be examined. One of the cases 
concerning the costs of the proceedings stems from a case initiated by a 
private litigant, but as this section deals with costs and not standing 
requirements per se, the fact that none of the cases concerning the issue of 
costs have been initiated by environmental NGOs, is irrelevant. 
 
Despite the fact that the implementation and efficiency of the Aarhus 
Convention is monitored and ensured by the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee,37 this case law will not be examined, despite from a 
few illustrative references to these judgements, as the focus instead is put on 
the CJEU’s interpretation of, and influence on, access to justice in 
environmental matters at EU Member State level. For the same reason, the 
European Convention of Human Rights, and the case law arising from it, 
falls outside the scope of this examination, despite a few references made to 
it in the presentation of the European Charter of fundamental rights. 
 
Lastly, there will be no in-depth analysis on the legal situation in the EU 
Member States, regarding the right to access to justice in environmental 
matters. Instead, only an overview of the varying problems and hinders to 
access to justice in these matters will be given. In particular, this will be 
demonstrated through the judgements presented in chapter four as they stem 
from requests for preliminary rulings made by the national courts, as well as 
infringements proceedings against the Member States. Likewise, the 
national perspective will partly be taken into account through the references 
of the effects of some of the CJEU’s judgements, as this is illustrated by 
examples of changed national legislation as well as judgements delivered by 
the Member States’ courts. 
                                                
36 See for instance Case C-237/07 Janecek (2008) ECR 1-6221, point 38. Even though the 
case concerned access to justice in environmental matters the Aarhus Convention was not 
mentioned, instead the CJEU relied on the interpretation of Directive 96/62 of 27 
September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management, OJ 1996 L296, p.55, 
as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 September 2003 OJ 2003 L 284. As the air quality legislation in question was 
designed to protect the public health, this was recognised as constituting a right of standing. 
37 Dellinger M, Ten years of the Aarhus Convention: How procedural democracy is paving 
the way for substantive change in national and international environmental law, 23 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 309 2012, at 322 
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2 The Aarhus Convention 
 
The Aarhus Convention is the first multilateral environmental agreement 
that exclusively focuses on the states’ obligations towards their citizens, 
instead of the Parties’ rights and obligations towards each other.38 The 
purpose of the Convention is to establish new means for environmental 
protection, by approaching environmental concerns via democratic changes, 
established by its three pillars. The first pillar sets out the right to access to 
information, the second regards public participation in decision-making, and 
the third pillar concerns access to justice in environmental matters. By 
granting citizens the right of access to environmental information it is 
believed public awareness of environmental concerns would be raised and 
the transparency of the national administrations and institutions improved.39 
The purpose of the second pillar is to create a greater public involvement in 
the decision-making process in order to strengthen the public support for 
decisions affecting the environment.40 The objective of the third pillar is to 
enable individuals and environmental organisations to challenge decisions 
through effective judicial mechanisms.  
 
2.1 Definitions 
The first paragraph of Article 3, that sets out the general provisions of the 
Convention, states “”Each Party shall take the necessary legislative, 
regulatory and other measures, including measures to achieve compatibility 
between the provisions implementing the information, public participation 
ad access-to-justice provisions in the Convention, as well as proper 
enforcement measures, to establish and maintain a clear, transparent and 
consistent framework to implement the provisions of this Convention”. 
 
The Convention solely applies to acts of ”public authorities” which is 
defined in Article 2(2) in a rather broad manner but expressively exclude 
”bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity”.41 What 
constitutes the ”environment” or ”environmental matter” on the other hand 
is not defined in the Convention despite the fact it is crucial in order to 
understand the scope application.42 On the other hand, it follows from the 
definition of ”environmental information” that this could be perceived as a 
broad concept.43 One of the major questions of this thesis is the issue of who 
                                                
38 Ibid., at 322 
39 Poncelet C, Access to justice in environmental matters – does the European union 
comply with its obligations, Journal of environmental law, 24:2, Oxford University press, 
2012, at 288  
40 Ibid., at 288 
41 Oliver (2013) supra note 16, at 1428 
42 Ibid., at 1431 
43 The Aarhus Convention supra note 2 at Article 2(3)(b), at 5-6  
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should have access to court. The significant concepts of ”the public” and 
”public concerned” are explained in Article 2(4) respectively in Article 2(5). 
The former mentioned article states “the public” includes environmental 
organisations fulfilling the requirements under national law. The second is 
defined as “the public affected or likely to be affected by”, or “having an 
interest in”, the environmental decision-making. Thereby, the Convention 
establishes provisions designated to fit into different legal cultures, by 
distinguishes between the systems that require the impairment of a right and 
those that do not. The objective of this approach is to reach a uniform 
standard, and oblige the states that require an impairment of a right to 
consider cases of violations of the provisions laid down in the Convention.44 
In addition to this, it should be emphasized that Article 2(5) establishes that 
non-governmental organisations promoting environmental protection, and 
meeting the requirements under national law, shall be deemed to have an 
interest, and the implications of this article will be examined further down 
the presentation. 
 
 
2.2 Access to justice 
The provisions regarding access to justice in environmental matters are laid 
down in Article 9. It is defined as “access for the public to procedures where 
legal review of alleged violations of the Convention and national law 
relating to the environment can be requested”.45 There are five important 
issues that the Convention stipulates regarding access to court. First, the 
review procedure shall enable any person to enforce his/her rights of access 
to information under article 4 of the Convention.46 Second, the review of 
decisions, acts or omissions subject to the provisions under article 6 of the 
Convention regarding public participation.47 Third, each party to the 
Convention shall ensure that members of the public have access to 
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by 
private persons and public authorities that contravene provisions of national 
law relating to the environment.48 It is worth to note that details for such 
procedures are not provided in the article, nor are the requirements the 
members of the public have to meet in order to access such procedures 
specified.49 Article 9(3) only states the members of the public, where they 
meet the criteria in national law of the parties to the convention, shall enjoy 
such access rights. Consequently, the parties to the convention retain a 
                                                
44 Jendroska J, Aarhus Convention and Community law: the interplay, 2 Journal of 
European Environmental & Planning Law 12 2005, at 18 
45 The Aarhus Convention: An implementation guide, second edition, 2013, to be found at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/ppdm/Aarhus_Implementation_Guide_secon
d_edition_-_text_only.pdf at 193 
46 The Aarhus Convention supra note 2 at Article 9(1) 
47 Ibid., Article 9(2) 
48 Ibid., Article 9(3) 
49 Garçon G, The right of access to justice in environmental matters in the EU, the third 
pillar of the Aarhus Convention, EFFL, 2, 2013, at 79 
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broad discretion on the implementation of the obligations set out in article 
9(3) since it only outlines a general requirement. Thereby, the parties are 
free to define their own national laws and conditions for access to 
procedures, as long as this general provision is met. Four, the parties to 
oblige is that the proceedings must provide adequate and effective remedies, 
and among other things be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively 
expensive.50 Lastly, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
provisions, the fifth paragraph adds that each Party shall ensure information 
on access to administrative and judicial review procedures is provided to the 
public, and in addition to this they should consider establishing appropriate 
assistance mechanism to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to 
access to justice.51 Nevertheless, it is important to note that according to 
article 3(8) national courts are able to award reasonable costs in judicial 
proceedings.  
 
2.3 The role of environmental NGOs 
The Aarhus Convention acknowledges the essential role NGOs can play in 
environmental protection. Most importantly, as stated in the introduction, 
environmental NGOs could function as “the voice of the environment”.52  
 
Regarding the review of procedure under article 9(2), it is expressly defined 
that an NGOs that meets the requirements set out in article 2(5) of the 
Convention shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of allowing access to 
the procedure covered by the article. Such NGOs also have rights under 
article 9(3), yet again because of Article 2(5), but these are conditioned by 
the provisions set out in national law, which shows the parties of the 
convention retain a broad discretion on the admissibility of NGO request for 
review and access to justice.53 Thereby, it should be underlined that the 
Aarhus legal framework does not give environmental NGOs a right to 
standing, it simply deems “NGOs promoting environmental protection” as 
having “sufficient interest” to have standing, but leaves it up to the Member 
States to define what constitutes a “sufficient interest”.54 Nevertheless, the 
Aarhus Compliance Committee has made it clear that a broad interpretation 
of the Convention should be the rule and not the exception.55   
 
The arguments put forward why environmental NGOs should have a wide 
access to justice are several, but most importantly it is believed to improve 
the enforcement of environmental laws. Moreover, granting these 
organisations wide access to justice might have a preventing effect, for 
example by putting pressure on the administrations to enforce the legislation 
                                                
50  The Aarhus Convention supra note 2 at Article 9(4) 
51 Ibid., Article 9(5) 
52 Stone (2010) supra note 17 at 1-31 
53 Garçon (2013) supra note 49 at 79 
54 Bogojevic S, CJEU, can you here me? Access to justice in environmental matters, 
Europarättslig tidsskrift nr 4 2013, at 736 (Bogojevic) 
55 Jans, Judicial Dialogue (2013) supra note 25 at 156 
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due to the fear of facing legal challenges.56 In addition to this, it is said to be 
in the interest of the industry that there are a consistent degree of 
enforcement of environmental law throughout the Union.57 On the other 
hand, broad access to justice in environmental matters for NGOs has been 
argued to risk overloading the courts. Nevertheless, there are indications the 
effect actually tends to be the opposite, since well-functioning NGOs have 
proven to be able to streamline and channel the cases put before the courts.58 
Furthermore, the high success-rate of the actions initiated by environmental 
NGOs implies these organisations concentrate on the significant cases, and 
provide sound arguments due to their expert knowledge in the 
environmental field. 59   
 
By giving environmental NGOs broad access to justice, the Aarhus 
Convention constitutes a compromise between the maximalist approach of 
the actio popularis and the minimalist approach that the right of individual 
action only should be available to parties with a direct interest.60 
Consequently, the Aarhus Convention enforces the role of environmental 
NGOs, and thereby enables the environment to have a voice, with the 
purpose of strengthening the decisions taken by the national authorities and 
improve the efficiency of procedures designated to prevent environmental 
damage.61  
 
2.4 The EU implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention 
Due to the EU’s conclusion of the Aarhus Convention, significant legal 
development took place in the Union.62 Especially, access to justice before 
national courts were expanded, and the possibility of standing for 
environmental NGOs were improved.63 In order to monitor that the Member 
States adapt to this legislation, the European Commission can initiate 
infringement proceedings64 against the Member States that do not comply 
with their obligations originating from the Convention, and take them to the 
CJEU.65 In fact, two of the judgements presented in chapter four stems from 
infringements proceedings. 
 
                                                
56 Dross Miriam, Access to justice in EU Member States, 2 Journal of European 
Environmental & Planning Law 2005, at 29 
57 Ibid., at 29 
58 Faure et al. (2013) supra note 26 at 126 and130 
59 Dross (2005) supra note 56 at 29 
60 AG Sharpston opinion in Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening 
(2009) para. 63  
61 Ibid., para. 64  
62 De Sadeleer N, EU environmental law and the internal market, Oxford University press, 
2014, at 99 (De Sadeleer) 
63 Ibid., at.99 
64 Article 258 TFEU 
65 Article 260 TFEU 
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2.4.1 The Aarhus Regulation 
The regulation on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental matters to community 
institutions and bodies was adopted on 6 September 2006, entered into force 
on 28 September and became applicable on 17 July 2007 (hereafter the 
Aarhus Regulation).66 The Regulation covers the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies established on the basis of the treaty. The main problem of the 
drafting of the Regulation was to combine the requirements laid down in 
Article 9(3) of the Convention, with the restrictive access to the EU Courts 
due to Article 230 of the Treaty (today altered and consisting of Article 263 
TFEU). In particular ensuring that NGOs should file lawsuits without being 
“directly and individually concerned”, proved to be a complicated task.67 
 
The Aarhus Regulation adopts a two-step approach regarding access to 
justice in environmental matters. First, there is a possibility of internal 
review of administrative acts adopted by the EU institutions according to its 
Article 10. It is stipulated in the Aarhus Regulation that NGOs meeting 
certain criteria, such as being able to verify that they are independent and 
accountable organisations whose primary objective is to promote 
environmental protection, to request internal review to the Community 
institution or body that has adopted an administrative act under 
environmental law or, in case of a claimed administrative omission, should 
have adopted such an act.68 Note that since the EU institutions do not take 
decisions falling under Article 9(2) off the Convention, the Aarhus 
Regulation in particular deals with Article 9(3).69 Through Article 12, 
environmental NGOs who made a request for internal review have the 
possibility to request judicial review by the CJEU, in accordance with 
relevant provisions of the Treaty. Nevertheless, it has been questioned, both 
in the doctrine and by the Aarhus Compliance Committee, whether EU 
actually obliges to the obligations established by the Aarhus Convention, 
especially regarding access to justice in environmental matters, as the access 
to the EU Courts is very restrictive.70   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
66 Regulation 1367/2006 supra note 33 at 13 
67 Jendroska (2005) supra note 44 at 20 
68 Regulation 1367/2006 supra note 33 at Article 10-11 & para. 20 in the preamble. 
69 Jans, Judicial Dialogue (2013) supra note 25 at 148 
70 Pallemaerts (2011) supra note 6 at 309-312, as well as findings made by the Aarhus 
Compliance Comittee in case ACCC/C/2008/32 
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2.4.2 The Directives 
The directives concerning the first and the second pillar were adopted in 
2003, namely Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental 
information repealing Council Directive 90/313/EC, and Directive 
2003/35/EC on public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain 
plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending, with 
regard to public participation and access to justice, the Environmental 
Assessment Directive (the EIA Directive)71 and the Directive concerning 
integrated pollution prevention and control (the IPPC Directive).72 Both 
Directive 2003/4/EC and Directive 2003/35/EC contain provisions on 
access to justice, relating to the rights contained in the pillars they are 
implementing. In that remark it should be noted the provisions on access to 
justice in the EIA Directive and IPPC Directive are identical, and more or 
less an exact copy of Article 9(2) and 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.73  
 
 
2.4.3 The proposed Directive on Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters 
As part of the implementation of the Aarhus Convention into Union law, the 
Commission made a proposal for a directive on access to justice in 
environmental matters in 2003.74  The aim of the proposal was to put the 
third pillar of the Aarhus convention into EU law, particularly Article 9(3), 
and secure environmental organisations have a right of standing in national 
courts when EU environmental law is breached.75 The proposal was based 
on art 175 EC (now art 192 TFEU) and supported by the European 
Parliament that wanted to strengthen the provisions.76 The proposal covered 
a double objective, namely to contribute to the implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention as well as fulfilling shortcomings, described in the 
introduction, regarding the control of the application of environmental 
law.77 In the proposal for the Directive it was underlined that while the 
Union legislation in the environmental field mainly focused on changing the 
substantive law, the procedural provisions and mechanisms to ensure its 
                                                
71 Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment (1985) OJ L175/40. Today, the EIA Directive and its amendments have 
been codified into Directive 2011/92 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment (2011) OJ L26/1 
72 Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (1996) OJ 
L257/26, which is now replaced by the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75 on industrial 
emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (2010) OJ L344/17 
73 Article 10a of the EIA Directive, Article 15a of the IPPC Directive, for more info see 
Jans J.H, Vedder H, European environmental law after Lisbon, 4 edition, Europa law 
publishing, Amsterdam at 376 
74 COM(2003) 624 final, supra note 22 
75 Krämer L, EU environmental law, 7th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011, at 146 
(Krämer) 
76 Ibid., at 146 
77 COM(2003) 624 final, supra note 22 at Explanatory Memorandum 1.1 
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effective application had been left to the Member States, which has resulted 
in “considerable differences in the practical application of environmental 
law”.78 Thereby, the proposed Directive sought to set out a common 
framework for the Member States to ensure EU environmental laws were 
respected, as inaction from the EU legislator was argued to result in 
different levels of environmental protection as well as different standards of 
environmental law enforcement in the Member States.79 Nevertheless, the 
proposal was never made into a directive since it met considerable objection 
in the Council as the Member States believed that access to national courts 
belonged to their competence due to the principle of subsidiarity.80 
Moreover, the Directive was considered by some Member State experts to 
go further than Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention required.81 Due to this 
inaction from the EU legislator, the requirements in article 9.3 of the 
Convention were left to the member states, resulting in great disparities 
between the national legal systems in this area.82 For instance, in some 
member states standing rules are too restrictive or litigation too costly and 
inefficient.83 Especially standing requirements for environmental NGOs 
tend to be very limiting in some member states.84   
 
From a political perspective today, there is now a clear interest from the EU 
institutions to improve access to justice at national level.85 In the 7th 
Environment Action Programme (hereafter EAP), which will be guiding EU 
environmental policy to 2020, the importance of better access to justice in 
environmental matters in order to maximise the benefits of EU 
environmental legislation by improving its implementation was 
recognized.86 In addition to this, the Commission has ordered several studies 
on the subject; one with focus on the Member States’ implementation of 
Articles 9(3) and 9(4) in the Member States,87 a second on the Member 
States’ complaint handling and mediation mechanisms in the environmental 
field,88 and a third concerning the possible economic implications of 
widening access to justice in environmental decision-making in the union.89 
The studies are intended to be utilized by the Commission when deciding on 
how to strengthen the enforcement of EU environmental law throughout the 
Union.90 
                                                
78 Ibid., at Explanatory Memorandum 3.2  
79 Ibid., at Memorandum 3.4 
80 Krämer (2011) supra note 75 at 147 
81 Faure et al. (2013) supra note 26 at 8 
82 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 3 
83 SPEECH Potočnik (2012) supra note 24 at 2 
84 Ibid., at 2 
85 Ibid., at 4 
86 Decision 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 November 
2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 “Living well, within the 
limits of our planet” OJ L 354, 28/12/2013, p. 171–200 
87 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 
88 André et al. Final, Study on environmental complaint-handling and mediation 
mechanisms at national level, Ecologic Institute, Berlin 12/12/2012 to be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/mediation_and_complaint-handling.pdf 
89 Faure et al. (2013) supra note 26 at 126 and130 
90 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 7 
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In the third study mentioned it was argued there are now reasons to put the 
idea of a Directive on access to justice in environmental matters back on the 
political agenda due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has now entered into 
force, and in particular because of the potential cost of inaction.91 Part of the 
goal of the research was to investigate to what extent the absence of a EU-
wide regime for access to justice in environmental matters is 
disadvantageous for operators. In fact, it was found in the study it could be 
argued non-action can result in substantial uncertainty and difference 
between Member States that are costly for operators.92 Therefore, it was 
presented in the report that harmonization from the EU-legislator could be 
used as a means to create legal certainty and thereby levelling the playing 
field.93 
 
The same conclusion was presented in the “Synthesis report of the study on 
the implementation of Article 9.3 and 9.4 in EU Member States”, where Jan 
Därpö found there is a need for a EU legislative framework to create a level 
playing field for environmental democracy in the union.94 In his opinion, a 
directive on access to justice in environmental matters would be necessary 
to promote predictability and legal certainty.95 He argued that the 
alternative, namely letting the CJEU  lead this development through the 
preliminary rulings procedure under Article 267, is too ineffective and time 
consuming. Despite the fact that the Court so far has delivered several 
important judgements on access to justice in environmental matters at 
national level, which will be explained in further detail in the next part of 
this paper, not all Member States have yet adopted their legislation to be 
consistent with all aspects of this case law.96 Therefore, Jan Därpö found the 
option rely solely on the CJEU, and the Member States adaptation to the 
case law, to be to slow and to uncertain. Despite this, he underlined that “the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU will continue to play an dynamic role in this area 
since a legislative framework at the Union level on access to justice in 
environmental matters will have to be quite basic, dealing only with the 
main elements of judicial review of administrative decision in a general 
way”.97 
 
 
                                                
91 Faure et al. (2013) supra note 26 at 8 
92 Ibid., at 121  
93 Ibid., at 121  
94 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 7 
95 Ibid., at 25 
96 See Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 25 where the national reports in the study showed that 
several of the Member States had not yet adapted their legislation to Case C-237/07 
Janecek (2008) ECR 1-6221.  
97 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 25 
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2.5 Direct effect? 
Do the provisions in the Aarhus Convention and the EU Directives have 
direct effect, meaning individuals and organisations can rely on them before 
national courts? To begin with, the principle of direct effect was first 
established in 1962 in Van Gend en Loos, where the CJEU ruled individuals 
should be able to invoke, or rely, on a specific EU legal rule before a 
national court if the rule in question is clear, precise and unconditional.98 In 
the Demirel case the Court extended this to be applicable on international 
treaties.99 Moreover, it has been established by the CJEU that provisions of 
EU law must as far as possible be interpreted in consistency with 
international agreements concluded by the Union.100 In addition to this, the 
national courts also have an obligation to interpret national procedural rules 
as far as possible in the light of the EU’s international commitments.101 
 
From the national perspective, the constitution in several member states 
declares that international treaties and conventions can have direct effect in 
the national legal order and/or overrule national law.102  On the other hand, 
there are member states where such primacy rules are non-existent. 
Nevertheless, several EU Member States’ constitutional law (written or un-
written) provide that national law must be interpreted in the light of 
international law in order to comply with it. Regarding the possible direct 
effect of specific provisions in the Aarhus Convention, this has been subject 
to detailed analysis for instance in some Member States for instance France, 
resulting in precise opinions concerning direct effect of certain parts of the 
Convention.103  In other countries, for instance Poland and the Czech 
Republic, the courts have had a cautious approach concerning the 
acceptance of any direct effect of the Convention.104 
 
Regarding the judgements delivered by the CJEU, in the field of 
environmental protection, the application of the principle of direct effect 
was first made in Pëcheurs de l’étang de Berre.105 Regarding the Aarhus 
Convention, the Court has found it to be an integral part of the EU legal 
order due to the fact that it was signed by the Union and thereafter approved 
by Decision 2005/370.106 The question whether the provisions of the 
                                                
98 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (1963) ECR 3 
99 Case 12/86 Demirel (1987) ECR I-3719 
100 Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-tech (1998) ECA 1-4301, para 22, regarding the Aarhus 
Convention Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, judgement of 8 March 2011, 
especially paras.50-51 
101 Case C-53/96 Hermès International (1998) ECA 1-3603, para. 28 
102 Jans, Judicial Dialogue (2013) supra note 25 at 151 
103 Jendroska J, Citizens rights in European Environmental law: Stock-taking of key 
challenges and current developments in relation to public access to information, 
participation and access to justice, Journal of European Environmental & Planning Law 9.1 
(2012) at 79 
104 Ibid., at 79 
105 Case C-213/03 Syndicat professionnel coordination de Pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre v 
Electricité de France (2004) ECR I-7359 
106 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia 
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Convention have direct effect has been addressed by the CJEU on several 
occasion, for instance in Boxuz,107 Trianel108 and the Slovak Brown Bear 
case.109  
 
Due to the fact that the Aarhus Convention is a mixed agreement, the Union 
made a declaration of competence stating that “the legal instruments in force 
do not cover fully the implementation of the obligations resulting from 
article 9(3) of the Convention as they related to administrative and judicial 
procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public 
authorities other than the institutions of the European Community as 
covered by article 1(2)(d) of the Convention, and that, consequently, its 
Member States are responsible for the performance of these obligations at 
the time of approval of the Convention by the European Community and 
will remain so unless and until the Community, in the exercise of its powers 
under the EC Treaty, adopts provisions of community law covering the 
implementation of those obligations”.110 Thereby, it was claimed that the 
EU Member States’ possible violation of article 9(3) could not result in 
international liability for the Union. As a result of this declaration it had 
been questioned whether the CJEU had the authority to interpret certain 
provisions of this mixed agreement.111 Nevertheless, this turned out not to 
be the case as the CJEU has given a judgement on article 9(3) in the Slovak 
Brown Bear case. The case will be examined in further detail in the case law 
analysis, but in essence the Court found the provisions in the article in 
question not to have direct effect as members of the public or environmental 
organisations only have access to court when they comply with the 
requirements laid down in national law. Nevertheless, the Court opened the 
door for giving the provision in question indirect effect as it was stated that 
national courts are obliged to interpret EU environmental law, and the 
national law transposing it, so individuals and environmental organisations 
gain access to justice ”to the fullest extent possible”, in order to enforce this 
law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
Slovenskej republiky,(2011) ECR I-01255 (Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie 
VLK) with reference to, by analogy, Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA (2006) ECR I-403, 
para. 36 and Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (2006) ECR I-4635, para. 82 
107 C-128/09 Boxus (2011) 
108 Case C-115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband 
Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v Bezirksregierung Arnsberg Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen 
(intervening)(2011) I-03673 (Case C-115/09 Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen) 
109 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK (2011) supra note 106 
110 See Decision 2005/370/EC, Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on 
behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision making and access to justice in environmental matters. OJ 2005 L 
124/1 and OJ 2006 L 164/17 
111 Jans, Judicial Dialogue (2013) supra note 25 at 149 
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
The Aarhus Convention has been upheld as a significant instrument to 
strengthen, and interlink, democracy and environmental protection. 
Accordingly, the Convention is expected to enforce the transparency and 
liability of governments. The increased ability for environmental NGOs to 
have standing is said to be its greatest innovation, by making them capable 
of bringing certain judicial proceedings “on behalf of the environment”.112 
As the costs of the proceedings might constitute an indirect hinder to access 
to justice in environmental matters, the rule established by the Convention 
that the costs must not be prohibitively expensive is also of substantial 
importance. 
 
The parties of the Aarhus Convention have an obligation “to ensure that the 
legitimate interest in protecting the environment and law enforcement are 
guaranteed by effective judicial mechanisms”.113 In the next chapter an 
overview of the right to effective judicial protection as well as the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence in relation to the principle of procedural 
autonomy, as well as the European Charter of fundamental rights, and how 
this might interact with the rights originated from the Aarhus Convention, 
will be given. This is made with the purpose to increase the comprehension 
of the CJEU’s reasoning in chapter four.  
 
                                                
112 Oliver (2013) supra note 16, at 1432 
113 Recitals 6, 8, and 18 of the Aarhus Convention supra note 2 
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3 Corresponding principles of 
EU law 
 
It has been stated that Article 47 in the Charter and Article 19 TEU “are the 
given starting points” when discussing access to justice in environmental 
matters at EU Member State level.114 Article 47 guarantees the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial, and Article 19.1(2) TEU goes further by 
obliging Member States to provide sufficient remedies in order to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law.115 As a result, 
those who are affected by Union law provisions relating to the environment 
must have the possibility to, in a national court, challenge any action, or 
inaction, by the public authority. Thereby, it has been suggested, that Article 
19.1(2) confirms the principle of effective judicial protection developed by 
the CJEU.116 
 
3.1 The principle of procedural autonomy 
It follows from the principle of subsidiarity, now enriched in Article 5(3) 
TEU, that the decisions should be taken as close to the citizens as possible. 
Consequently, every competence not given to the Union belongs to the 
Member States. As the Union has a strictly limited competence in the area 
of procedural rules, it is up to the Member States to define their competent 
courts and lay down the procedural rules in the national legislation, which is 
known as the principle of procedural autonomy. Therefore, the way in 
which a provision of Union law can be invoked before national courts 
largely depends on national law.117 It has been established that national 
procedural environmental law varies between the member states.118 
Therefore, in absence of harmonized rules, procedural law regarding access 
to justice in environmental matters remains to be determined by the member 
states.119 As a result, there have been difficulties for private individuals and 
environmental NGOs to gain access to the member state courts due to, for 
instance, restrictions imposed on the interest to sue, duration of the 
proceedings, and financial risks which altogether creates obstacles to the 
invocation of an EU law provision incorrectly transposed before the national 
courts.120 It has been argued that these national hinders weaken the 
environmental protection within EU.121 Due to the number of hurdles 
                                                
114 Därpö (2013) supra note 28 at 26 
115 Ibid., at 27 
116 Ibid., at 27 
117 Jans, Judicial Dialogue (2013) supra note 25 at 145 
118 Ibid., at 145 
119 De Sadeleer (2014) supra note 62 at 102 
120 Ibid., at 102 
121 Ibid., at 102  
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applicants have to overcome in some Member States in order to gain access 
to court in environmental matters, it could be questioned whether the 
Member States’ procedural autonomy will have to be undermined by the 
principle of effective judicial protection and effet utile.122 On the other hand, 
national procedural rules should not lightly be set aside as they may be 
deeply routed in, and reflect, the cultural and ethical values of the Member 
State in question.123 
 
The principle of national procedural autonomy was first established in the 
Rewe/Comet case. 124 The Court concluded that on one hand, where EU law 
confers personal or individual rights, it follows from the principle of 
cooperation, today laid down in Art 4(3) TEU, that the national courts are 
obligated to protect these rights. As a result, individuals can rely on their 
rights in national courts, but in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is 
up to the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the 
competent courts and determine the procedural rights citizens have from the 
direct effect of EU law.125 Moreover, it was established that the principle of 
procedural autonomy is subject to two conditions. First, the national 
procedural rules designated to uphold an individual’s rights under EU law 
must be no less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a 
domestic nature, today known as the principle of equivalence. Second, 
procedural conditions laid down in national law may not make it impossible 
in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU 
law, today known as the principle of effectiveness. It is important to 
emphasize that this doctrine is only applicable in the absence of union rules 
on procedural matters.126 Moreover, the interpretation of principle of 
procedural autonomy in the Rewe/Comet case law is not absolute. 127  
 
An example on the balancing between the Member States’ procedural 
autonomy and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, from the case 
law concerning the interpretation of the right to access to justice in 
environmental matters originating from the Aarhus Convention is the 
Trianel case.128 The circumstances and outcome of the case will be 
examined in further detail in the next chapter, but in this context it should be 
noted the Court based its judgement, besides from the Aarhus Convention 
and the EU implementation of it, on an extensive interpreted principle of 
                                                
122 Ibid., at 102 
123 Arnull A, The principle of effective judicial protection in EU law: An unruly horse? 
European Law review 36(1) (2011) at 52, with reference to J. Delicostopoulos, Towards 
European procedural primacy in national legal systems, 9 European Law Journal (2003) at 
599 
124 Case C-33/76 Rewe v Comet (1976) ECR 1523 
125 Ibid., at para. 54 
126 Jans J.H, Vedder H, European environmental law after Lisbon, 4 edition, Europa law 
publishing, Amsterdam at 231 
127 De Sadeleer N, EU environmental law and the internal market, Oxford University press, 
2014, at 103 
128 Case C-115/09 Trianel Kohlekraftwek Lünen (2011) supra note 108 
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effectiveness.129 In addition to this, Advocate General Sharpston concluded 
in the Djurgaarden case, which also will be presented in further detail in the 
next part, that the application of the principle of effectiveness would have 
the same result as the application of the specific provisions on effective 
judicial protection provided for in Article 9 of the Convention, inserted in 
Article 10a of Directive 85/337.130  
 
3.2 The principle of effective judicial 
protection 
Alongside the development of the principle of effectiveness, the principle of 
effective judicial protection was established by the CJEU.  It originates from 
the Johnston case,131 and through the case law it was later developed into a 
general principle of Union law.132 Due to the principle of effective judicial 
protection national courts are required to adjust natural procedures to secure 
the rights deriving from EU law are protected.133 In Unibet134 the CJEU 
found the principle had been reaffirmed in Article 47 of the European 
Charter of fundamental rights, which guarantees the right to an effective 
remedy and a fair trial. Furthermore, the Court underlined that the Member 
State are responsible for ensuring judicial protection of an individual’s 
rights under EU law, due to the principle of sincere co-operation which 
today is found in Article 4(3) TEU. Moreover, it was concluded that due to 
the principle of effective judicial protection the national courts have a duty 
of consistent interpretation similar to the one laid down the Marleasing 
judgement.135 Consequently, the judgement made in Unibet made it clear 
that the overriding consideration for the national courts should be the 
safeguarding of union law rights, by stating that national procedural 
                                                
129 Lohse E, Suprise? Suprise! – Case C-115/09 (Kohlekraftwek Lûnen) – A victory for the 
environment and a loss for procedural autonomy of the Member States? European Public 
Law 18, no.2 (2012) Kluwer Law International, at 249 (Lohse) 
130 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 2 July 2009 in Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla 
Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v Stockholms kommun genom dess marknämnd para. 80  
131 Case C-222/84 Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (1986) ECR 1651 
132 case C-125/01 Peter Pflücke v. Bundesanstalt fûr Arbeit (2003) ECR 1-9375, Case C-
432/05 Unibet (2007)  ECR I-2271 para.37, Case C-279/09 DEB (2010) ECR I-13849, 
para.29 
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134 Case C-432/05 Unibet (2007)  ECR I-2271 
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autonomy in merely an aspect of the broader principle of effective judicial 
protection.136 
 
Lastly, what is the distinction between the principle of effective judicial 
protection and the principle of effectiveness? To begin with it should be 
underlined that this question is debated in the doctrine. In fact, it has been 
questioned if there is a need to make a distinction at all, with the argument 
that these two principles are now subsumed under Article 47 of the Charter 
of fundamental rights.137 Additionally, there are more similarities than 
differences between the two principles. On the other hand it has been 
suggested recent judgements delivered by the Court could be interpreted as 
redefining the relationship between the two principles, implying they should 
be seen as separate.138 In the doctrine, for instance Sacha Prechal, judge in 
the CJEU, argued a separate application of these principles is desirable as 
they ”serve different purposes and are driven by different rationales”.139 
Sacha Prechal states the principle of effectiveness, in combination with the 
principle of equivalence, aim to guarantee the effective application of 
substantive EU law, while the primary aim of the principle of effective 
judicial protection is further interlinked with the fundamental right of access 
to court, and accordingly with the concept of the rule of law. As a result, he 
reasons the principle of effectiveness, essentially functions as the ”outer 
limits” to the Member States’ national procedural autonomy, and is mainly 
relevant in legal areas not yet covered by the requirement of effective 
judicial protection.140  
 
3.3 The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
According to Article 47 of The European Charter of fundamental rights 
(hereafter EUCFR), everyone whose rights and freedoms, guaranteed by 
Union law, have been violated have the right to an effective remedy. Article 
6(1) TEU states that the Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter, and that these have the same legal value as 
the treaties. 
 
Regarding access to justice in environmental matters, it should also be 
remembered that article 37 of the Charter provides for the integration of a 
high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality 
of the environment into the policies of the union. It is, however, notable that 
while article 47 constitutes a right; article 37 is merely a principle, which is 
                                                
136 Arnull A, The principle of effective judicial protection in EU law: An unruly horse? 
European Law review 36(1) (2011) at 55 
137 Prechal S, Redefining the relationship between ”Rewe-effectiveness” and effective 
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138 Ibid., at 50 
139 Ibid., at 50 
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more of a policy requirement rather than an individual right.141  As a result 
Article 37, in contrast to Article 47, can not be invoked directly which 
follows from the interpretation of Article 52(5) EUCFR. Thus, the main, 
relevant part of the Charter in this context therefore is Article 47. Since the 
origin and significance of a segment of its underlying principles, namely the 
principle of effectiveness, equivalence and effective judicial protection, was 
examined in the previous part, the following presentation will focus on the 
specific role of the provisions embedded in Article 47 due to the status of 
the Charter. 
 
Through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty Article 47 in the Charter 
of the previously presented principle of effective judicial protection has 
acquired written, primary law status.142 The CJEU relatively often refers to 
this codification of the principle, actually even before the Charter became 
binding for the Union and the Member States, for instance in Unibet.143 
Concerning the interpretation of the rights stemming form the Aarhus 
Convention, General Advocate Kokott in her opinion in Commission v 
Ireland concerning the costs of environmental proceedings, relied on the 
Charter for guidance before it had any binding legal effect comparable with 
primary law.144  
 
The scope of the rights corresponding to rights laid down in ECHR should 
be interpreted in the light of the Convention itself and the case law of the 
ECrtHR.145 In fact, the CJEU’s interpretation of the principle of effective 
judicial protection, and consequently Article 47, is influenced of the case 
law from the ECrtHR on Article 6, the right to a fair trial, and Article 13 the 
right to an effective remedy.146 Since the application of the Convention of 
Human Rights falls outside the scope of this thesis, its influence on the 
CJEU will not be further analysed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
since Article 47 of the Charter must be given the “same meaning and scope” 
as the corresponding provisions in the ECHR, which have been interpreted 
by the ECtHR as guaranteeing access to justice and an effective remedy in 
environmental matters,147 both EU and the national Courts should apply 
Article 47 in the light of this case law.148 Due to the fact that the EU and the 
Member States are parties to the Aarhus Convention, this interpretation is 
further supported by the obligations related to access to justice in 
environmental matters.149  
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3.4 Concluding remarks 
The aim of the previous presentation has been to provide an overview of 
sources of EU law that might interact with the right established by the 
Aarhus Convention regarding access to justice in environmental matters. 
For example, it was found in Edwards and Pallikaropoulos, which will be 
further explained in the next part, that the requirement that the costs of 
environmental proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive relates to 
the observance of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 in 
the European Charter of fundamental rights.150 In addition to this, the CJEU 
referred to the principle of effectiveness as well, since detailed procedural 
rules governing actions for safeguarding individuals’ rights under EU law 
must not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights under 
EU law. Thereby, the CJEU’s interpretation of access to justice in 
environmental matters, established by the Aarhus Convention, is influenced 
by the fundamental principles EU law, which will be further elaborated in 
the next chapter. 
 
                                                
150 Case C-260/11 The Queen, on the application of David Edwards and Another v 
Environment Agency and Others, judgement of 11 April 2013, para. 33 (Case C-260/11 
Edwards and Pallikaropoulos) 
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4 Case law from the Europrean 
Court of Justice 
 
The aim of this section is to investigate how the CJEU has interpreted 
national standing rules in the light of the Aarhus Convention, and the 
relevant EU legislation, in particular the Aarhus Regulation but also 
Directive 2003/35 amending the EIA and the IPPC Directive. The purpose 
is not to examine the case law only dealing with standing rights per se, but 
also the cases concerning the cost of litigation as this has an indirect effect 
on the national courts’ accessibility. 
 
First, the core of the thesis, namely the CJEU’s interpretation on national 
requirements for environmental NGOs will be presented. This will be 
followed by a concluding analysis of the judgements occasionally illustrated 
and compared with the opinions delivered by Advocate General Sharpston. 
On this remark, the opinions of the Advocate General are of significant 
importance as they highlight and evaluate the possible role environmental 
NGOs can play in the protection of the environment, in this context. 
Thereafter, the case law concerning the cost of litigation will be examined, 
accomplished by an analysis where the opinions delivered by Advocate 
General Kokott will be taken into account. Lastly, some final remarks on the 
effects and outcomes of the judgements will be given. 
 
 
4.1 The role of environmental NGOs 
The purpose of this section is to examine how the CJEU interprets national 
legislation concerning standing requirements for NGOs promoting 
environmental protection, as well as the Court’s reasoning concerning the 
role of these organisations in the light of the Aarhus Convention, and the 
relevant EU legislation.  
 
4.1.1 Djurgården-Lilla Värtans 
Miljöskyddsförening  
 
The main question of the case is to what extent Member States are able to 
impose restrictions on environmental NGOs access to justice. The case 
concerned a Swedish legislation that only allowed standing for 
Environmental NGOs with at least 2000 members. 
 
The NGO Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöförening appealed a judgement by 
the Environmental Chamber of the district court of Stockholm that granted 
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development consent in the area of Hjorthagen. Due to the fact that the 
NGO in question had not fulfilled the requirement under national law on 
having at least 2000 members to be allowed standing, the appeal was found 
to be inadmissible. The NGO challenged the decision before the Supreme 
Court that referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling asking in 
essence whether the Swedish rule was too restrictive in relation to the EIA 
Directive and the Aarhus Convention.  
 
First, the CJEU found that members of the public concerned must have 
access to a review procedure unconditioned by their role in the decision-
making procedure.151 Regarding the Swedish requirements for NGOs to 
have 2000 Members to have access to justice, the CJEU stated Article 1(2) 
read in conjunction with article 10a of the EIA Directive, which implements 
the Aarhus Convention, states that the NGOs meeting any requirement 
under national law are to be seen either as having sufficient interest or as 
having rights that are capable of being impaired by projects falling within 
the scope of the Directive.152 Even though the previously mentioned articles 
leave it up to the national legislation to determine the conditions that may be 
required for NGOs to have the right to appeal, these rules must ensure wide 
access to justice. Moreover, these national rules must not be liable to nullify 
Union provisions designated to enable qualified applicants to have access to 
justice in environmental matters.153 The condition that an environmental 
protection association must have a minimum number of members may be 
relevant to ensure that it does exist and that it is active, but the number 
cannot be at such a level that it runs counter to the objectives of facilitating 
judicial review.154 Moreover, with reference to the opinion of the Advocate 
General, the Court noted the Swedish legislation deprived small, local 
NGOs of the right to any judicial remedy.155 In fact there were only two 
environmental NGOs in Sweden that had more than 2000 members, and 
these organizations may not have the same interest in smaller, regional 
projects as the local organisations. In conclusion, the court therefore found 
that national legislation could not limit the standing for NGOs to 
organizations that have at least 2000 members as it would run counter to the 
objective of giving environmental NGOs wide access to justice. 
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4.1.2 Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen 
 
The case concerns access to justice for environmental NGOs aiming to 
enforce the provisions providing for public participation in decision-making, 
under the EIA Directive.156  
 
The company Trianel had been granted a permit to build and operate a coal-
fired power plant, situated within 8 km of five special conservation areas 
protected under the Habitats Directive. The NGO Friends of the Earth 
sought to have the permit annulled, arguing it infringed the German law that 
transposed the Habitat Directive.157 The German court, however, found that 
according to national law, neither an environmental NGO nor any other 
claimant could bring an action for an infringement of law without any 
alleged impairment of individual rights. As the law in question did not 
protect individual rights, the NGO could not seek an annulment of the 
permit. According to Article 10a of the EIA Directive, that reflects Article 
9(2) in the Aarhus Convention, Member States are required to allow 
members of the public concerned who either have sufficient interest or 
maintain an impairment of a right to have access to a judicial appeals 
process. Moreover, it states that national legislation defining sufficient 
interest and impairment of a right must be consistent with the objective of 
giving the public concerned wide access to justice. Since the German Court 
questioned whether the national legislation undermined the provisions of art 
10a of the EIA Directive they asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  
 
The CJEU stated it followed from Article 10a of the EIA Directive, in the 
light of the objectives of the Aarhus Convention and the Directive, that 
environmental NGOs should be given a broad right to standing in order to 
safeguard the effective implementation of laws designed to protect the 
environment.158 The Court therefore found environmental NGOs meeting 
the requirement set up in article 1(2) of the EIA Directive deemed to have a 
sufficient interest and rights capable of being impaired in rules which are 
precise and not subject to other conditions. As a result these environmental 
NGOs should have a right to standing before national courts, in an action 
contesting decision authorising projects that are considered likely to have an 
significant effect on the environment. Consequently, the Court found the 
German legislation to be too restrictive and thereby hinder the objective of 
giving environmental NGOs wide access to justice.  
 
                                                
156 Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment O.J 1985, L 175/40 as amended by Directive 97/11/EC, O.J. 
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157 Directive 93/43/EEC 
158 Case C-115/09 Trianel Kohlekraftwek Lünen, supra note 108 paras 41-48 
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4.1.3 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK 
The case, often referred to as the Slovak Brown Bear case, concerned, in 
essence, the interpretation of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, and in 
particular the question on whether it has direct effect.  
 
The environmental NGO Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK sought to in 
court contest the Slovakian Government’s grant of licences to hunt brown 
bears. The request was rejected, and the NGO appealed to the Supreme 
Court which referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling regarding 
whether and how a particular aspect of the Slovak administrative procedural 
law was affected by article 9(3) in the Aarhus Convention.  
 
The first two question concerned the issue whether individuals, and in 
particular environmental organisations, seeking to challenge a decision to 
derogate from a system of environmental protection such as the one 
established by the Habitats Directive,159 might derive a right to bring 
proceedings under EU law, and in that matter, if Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention has direct effect. To begin with, the Court noted that it followed 
from settled case law that since the Aarhus Convention was signed by the 
Union and subsequently approved by Decision 2005/370, its provisions 
constitute an integral part of the EU legal order.160 As a result, the CJEU has 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning such agreement, within 
the framework of that legal order.161 Therefore, it had to be determined if 
the EU legislator has exercised its powers in the field covered by Article 
9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.162 With that in mind, the Court first 
underlined the fact that the Union has explicit external competence in the 
field of environmental protection.163 Regarding the circumstances of the 
case, the CJEU found the issue fell within the scope of EU law since the 
Slovakian brown bears were protected under the EU Habitats Directive.164 
The Court continued by noting that it was stated in the declaration of 
competence made in accordance with Article 19(5) of the Aarhus 
Convention and annexed to Decision 2005/370, that ‘the legal instruments 
in force do not cover fully the implementation of the obligations resulting 
from Article 9(3) of the Convention as they relate to administrative and 
judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and 
public authorities other than the institutions of the European Community as 
covered by Article 2(2)(d) of the Convention, and that, consequently, its 
Member States are responsible for the performance of these obligations at 
the time of approval of the Convention by the EU and will remain so unless 
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and until the Community, in the exercise of its powers under the EC Treaty, 
adopts provisions of Community law covering the implementation of those 
obligations’.165 Despite this, the Court emphasized the fact that a specific 
issue that has not yet been subject to EU legislation still may fall within the 
scope of EU law if it relates to a field covered in large measure by it. In that 
remark, Article 9(3) has been incorporated into EU law through the 
Regulation 1367/2006, hereafter the Aarhus Regulation. The Court 
emphasized it was irrelevant that the Aarhus Regulation only concerns the 
institutions of the European Union, and therefore cannot be seen as an 
implementation of Article 9(3) with respect for national administrative or 
judicial proceedings. Hence, the CJEU found that ”where a provision can 
apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to 
situations falling within the scope of EU law, it is clearly in the interest of 
the latter that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that 
the provisions should be interpreted uniformly.”166  
 
Consequently, regarding the possible direct effect of the provision, the court 
concluded the Union had exercised its powers under article 9(3), and the 
Court therefore was competent to give a ruling, but found that as the 
provision did not contain a clear and precise obligation it did not have direct 
effect.167 Nevertheless, the CJEU underlined that national courts are obliged 
to interpret EU environmental law, and the national law that transposes EU 
law, in order to ensure individuals and environmental organisations gain 
access to justice ”to the fullest extent possible”, in order to enforce this 
law.168 The CJEU therefore concluded the national courts must, whenever 
they can, give standing in such cases to make sure EU environmental law is 
properly enforced.  
 
4.1.4 Comment 
The rulings from the CJEU have improved and widened environmental 
NGO’s access to the Member States’ courts in environmental matters, by 
making clear that environmental NGOs must have standing in national 
courts during certain circumstances. In addition to the judgement of the 
Court, the opinions of Advocate General Sharpston is worth some attention 
due to the arguments she put forward regarding the role NGOs could play in 
environmental proceedings. 
 
First, in the Djurgaarden case the CJEU proclaimed that national 
requirements cannot be too restrictive and they have to be interpreted in the 
light of the objectives of the Aarhus Convention, which includes giving 
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NGOs wide access to the courts.169 In the opinion delivered by Advocate 
General Sharpston, she examined the potential role of NGOs. She concluded 
there are several reasons to grant environmental NGOs wide access to 
justice, and the underlying logic is the fact that “the individual is better 
protected by acting in a group and the group is collectively strengthened by 
its individual members.”170 Successively, she argued, environmental NGOs 
can give expression to collective interest, and through their capacity of 
representing several different parties they have the ability to protect general 
objectives.171 She emphasized that environmental NGOs can play an 
important role in strengthening the function of the courts, by their ability to 
bring together claims from several individuals into one single action. 
Moreover, as the environmental NGOs posses specialized knowledge in the 
environmental field, it enables them to distinguish the important cases, and 
thereby they have the capacity to rationalise how various conflicting 
interests are voiced and placed before the courts.172 Subsequently, the 
Advocate General concluded that any national restrictions whose effect is to 
hinder rather than to facilitate access to justice for environmental NGOs 
must be rejected.173  
 
Despite the fact that the Court did not go a s far as the General Advocate 
Sharpston did in her opinion where she concluded that any environmental 
NGO, within the definition set out in national legislation in accordance with 
Article 1(2) in the EIA Directive, has an automatic right to standing, the 
judgement of the Court shows it intends to ensure environmental NGOs 
have an effective right to access to justice.174 Moreover, this is in line with 
previous case law from the Court showing Member States cannot introduce 
procedural rules that make the exercise of the rights guaranteed by EU law 
impossible.175 In conclusion, the judgement of the Court is noteworthy as it 
highlights the role of small, local NGOs as enforces of EU environmental 
law.176 On the other hand, it has been argued it is unfortunate neither the 
CJEU or the Advocate General addressed the inherent contradiction 
between the Member States’ expressed right, both in the Aarhus Convention 
and the relevant EU Directives, to lay down the standing requirements for 
environmental NGOs and their obligation to ensure “wide access to 
justice”.177 Thereby, the limited guidance provided by the Court in the case 
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does not increase the legal certainty in these matters.178 Lastly, it should be 
noted that due to the judgement in Djurgården the Swedish legislation has 
been changed, and today any organization with 100 members or more can 
appeal decision on permits and near-related issues, which has not increased 
the workload of the Swedish administrative courts179  
 
In Trianel the CJEU ruled that NGO’s must fulfil the requirement under 
national law, and they must also contend an infringement of provisions 
originated from EU environmental law regardless of the fact that they give 
rights not only to individuals but to the general public.180. As Advocate 
General Sharpston put it in her opinion, the environmental NGO in the case 
was seeking to act on behalf of the environment, which was not possible 
under the German legislation as a party wishing to bring an action for 
judicial review had to rely on the infringement of a substantive individual 
right.181 As a result, environmental NGOs could not request a review of an 
administrative action only because it violates a provision protecting the 
environment as such. Advocate General Sharpston underlined the fact that 
one of the express objectives of the Aarhus Convention is to widen access to 
justice in environmental matters. Regarding the argument put forward by the 
German government that this might overload the national courts, she stated 
that allowing environmental NGOs to bring actions before the courts may 
have the opposite effect, as it “may result in a more efficient and cost-
efficient use of limited judicial resources”.182 Moreover, she noted that in 
reality a very small percentage of the environmental actions in Germany are 
brought by environmental NGOs. Unlike the Advocate General, the CJEU 
also interpreted the German legislation via the principle of effectiveness and 
concluded in the specific case the interpretation of Article 10a of the EIA 
Directive lead to a limitation of the national procedural autonomy as the 
approach taken by Germany was in breach of the principle of effectiveness. 
Even though both Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention and Article 10a of 
the Directive says the implementation of its provisions should be done “in 
accordance with the relevant legal system” and that it is up to the Member 
State to determine what constitutes a “sufficient impairment of a right” 
resulting in right to access to justice, the Court’s judgement thereby limited 
the Member States’ margin of implementation in this matter.183  
 
Due to the outcome of the case, it is arguable that there has been an 
increased ability for environmental NGOS to act as the voice of the 
environment, as the Court disqualified the German legislation for being too 
restrictive concerning environmental NGOs access to court. The judgement 
of the case put environmental NGOs in a “privileged position”, regarding 
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their locus standi. 184 Despite the fact that the judgement relates to the 
implementation of Article 9(2) of the Convention, it has been suggested the 
reasoning could apply to the obligations arising from Article 9(3).185 
Moreover, the case has had significant outcome on the interpretation of the 
national law by the German courts, illustrated by the fact that a list of 17 
judgements given by German administrative courts applying the Trianel 
judgement that was submitted by the German government to the 
Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2008/31.186 In addition to this, 
Germany amended its legislation in order to comply with the judgement. 
However, the European Commission found the modifications of the German 
legislation to be insufficient, and therefore the Commission decided to take 
Germany to the CJEU over access to justice in environmental matters.187  
 
In Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK the CJEU clarified that environmental 
NGO’s must not only have access to national courts in order to enforce their 
right to environmental information or their right to public participation, they 
should also be given access to court in other matters governed by EU 
environmental law, in line with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.188 
Nevertheless, the Court found the provision laid down in Article 9(3) did 
not have direct effect. As Advocate General Sharpston put it in her opinion, 
“Article 9(3) does not contain obligations that are sufficient clear and 
precise to govern the legal position of individuals directly, without further 
clarification or precision”.189 She highlighted the fact that the right for 
members of the public, by virtue of Article 9(3), to have access to 
administrative or judicial procedures is conditioned under the criteria laid 
down in national law, and neither the article itself nor other provisions of 
the Convention clarifies “what those criteria might or should be”.190 
Actually, she noted, the intention of the drafters of the Convention seems to 
be that this definition should be left to the parties. Consequently, in absence 
of express limitation, the potential scope of the article might be very wide, 
and if Article 9(3) would be given direct effect the possibility for Member 
States to lay down specific criteria would be bypassed, resulting in 
consequences equal to establishing an actio popularis. Subsequently, she 
underlined that the Directive on access to justice in environmental matters 
remains un-adopted, and therefore it would be inappropriate for the 
judiciary to take this step instead of the EU legislature.191  
 
It should be noted that the Slovak Brown Bear case was decided in grand 
chamber, which both gives the judgement weight and makes it unlikely to 
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be changed. Nevertheless, it has been argued in the doctrine that the 
practical effect of article 9(3), due to this judgement, can be questioned.192 
As a result of the case, applicants will have to persuade the national courts 
of the objective and spirit of article 9(3) in order to be given standing and 
since courts have a tendency to be rather conservative, the effect of the 
judgement will be that article 9(3) will not be very relevant in practice.193 
Therefore, it has been suggested it was possible for the Court to declare that 
the provisions of article 9(3) to be directly applicable and give standing for 
members of the public, until the Member State had laid down conditions to 
restrict such actions.194 Instead of acknowledging the burden of legislation 
laid upon the Member States, the Court practically allowed them to benefit 
of their own positivity to lay down specific conditions.195 Moreover, this is 
not in line with previous judgements delivered by the court regarding direct 
effect, as the court actually has argued that Member States should not be 
allowed to invoke its own omission to act to oppose the notion of direct 
effect of a EU provision.196  
 
On the other hand, there have been judgements delivered form national 
courts contravening this prediction. To begin with, as a result of the 
judgement delivered in the Slovak Brown Bear case, the Supreme Court of 
the Slovak Republic decided to give standing to the NGOs concerning the 
authorisations to hunt the brown bears.197 Through this decision, the court 
actually went beyond the requirement of “confirm interpretation” that been 
laid down by the CJEU, since it was in fact not possible to merely interpret 
the national law which clearly denied standing for NGOs.198 As a result, the 
Slovakian Supreme Court gave the obligations of Article 9(3) of the 
Convention direct effect, by dis-applying the conflicting standing rules laid 
down in national law.199 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
judgement may have implications on, and increase the possibility for 
environmental NGOs to have the right to standing, in other legal systems 
such as Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.200 In addition to this, 
the Stockholm Administrative Court in Sweden has relied on the ruling in 
the Slovak Brown Bear case.201 The case concerned the governmental 
decision to authorise the killing of wolves, a strictly protected species under 
the Habitats Directive.202 These policies have been the subject to an on-
going infringement proceeding by the European Commission.203 According 
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to Swedish procedural law, only the government is able to represent the 
public interest in administrative decision making and in the court, but as the 
national Court applied the ruling in the Slovak Brown Bear case, the 
national law was interpreted in order to allow environmental NGOs the 
possibility to challenge administrative decision for the protection of species 
under the Habitat Directive.204  
 
In conclusion, the previously presented judgements on how the CJEU 
interprets national standing rules, have clarified the role of environmental 
NGOs, as well as giving effect for these organisations to have a broad right 
to standing before the national courts. The judgements in the Trianel Case 
and Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK “can be seen as a trend following the 
ruling in the Djurgaarden Case”.205 The judgements have not solely been 
based on the Aarhus Convention, and the EU Directives implementing it. 
For instance, the Aarhus Regulation, despite the fact that it applies to the EU 
institutions and bodies, was of significant importance for the Court 
interpretation regarding their ability to give a judgement on Article 9(3) of 
the Convention. Furthermore, the need for natural procedural rules in this 
matter to be consistent with, and respect, the principle of effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection has had a substantial influence on the reasoning 
of the CJEU.206  Lastly, these judgements are of significant importance for 
the full application of the rights guaranteed by the Aarhus Convention, and 
the Union implementation of it, at EU Member State level. 
 
 
4.2 The costs of environmental 
proceedings  
Due to the fact that the costs of the proceedings might constitute a barrier to 
access to justice in environmental matters, the scope and the definition of 
the rule established by the Arhus Convention that the costs in environmental 
proceedings must not be prohibitively expensive is of significant 
importance.207 The term “costs” includes participation or administrative 
appeal fees, court fees and other court costs, lawyers’ experts’ and witness’ 
fees, as well as securities or cross-undertakings in damages. It has been 
concluded that “the cost of the judicial procedures is considered to be an 
obstacle to environmental justice – or at least to have a dissuasive effect 
thereupon”, in the majority of the EU Member States.208 
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The CJEU has delivered three significant judgements on this matter; two 
stemming from infringements proceedings, and one from a request for a 
preliminary ruling. In the next part, a presentation of these judgments will 
be given, followed by a concluding analysis.  
 
4.2.1 Commission v Ireland 
The case concerns, in essence, the Commission’s claim that Ireland had 
failed to transpose a number of EU law provisions209 concerning access to 
justice, such as the obligation to inform the public about their rights in this 
matter, as well as the rule that the proceedings cannot be prohibitively 
expensive, into national law. The most relevant outcome of the case, in the 
context of this thesis, concerns the Court’s reasoning regarding the costs of 
the proceedings. 
 
To begin with, the CJEU underlined it follows from established case-law 
that the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable 
binding force and with specificity, precision and clarity required to satisfy 
the need for legal certainty, which requires that, regarding a directive 
conferring rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to 
ascertain the full extent of their rights.210 The CJEU found Ireland had failed 
to transpose the Directive regarding the requirement that the procedures in 
question must not be prohibitively expensive. The CJEU stressed the fact 
that in Ireland there was no applicable ceiling on the amount that a 
successful applicant would have to pay, nor were there any legal provisions 
referring to the rule that the procedure would not be prohibitively expensive. 
The Court concluded it is clear from Article 10a of the EIA Directive, 
inserted by Article 3(7) of Directive 2003/35, and Article 15a of the IPPC 
Directive, inserted by Article 4(4) of Directive 2003/35, that procedures 
established in the context of those provisions must not be prohibitively 
expensive.211 The CJEU underlined this only covers costs arising from 
participation in such procedures, and the condition does not hinder the 
courts from making an order for costs if the amount in question complies 
with that requirement. Furthermore, the CJEU held that the fact that it is 
common ground that the courts in Ireland may decline to order the 
unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the procedure, and in addition order 
expenditure incurred by the unsuccessful party to be borne by the other, 
cannot by its definition be certain. 212 As a result, this cannot be seen as a 
correct implementation of the Aarhus Conventions condition that 
environmental proceedings must not be ”prohibitively expensive”.  
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4.2.2 Edwards and Pallikaropoulos  
 
The case concerned the rule that judicial proceedings should not be 
prohibitively expensive, laid down in Article 9(5) of the Aarhus Convention 
and implemented by Article 10a paragraph five of the EIA Directive and the 
Article 15a paragraph 5 of the IPPC Directive, as amended by Directive 
2003/35/EC.  
 
Mr Edwards had brought an action for judicial review of a permit for a large 
cement work, relying on the fact that the project had not been subject to an 
environmental impact assessment. The action was dismissed, and even 
though he appealed the case he eventually decided to withdraw and instead 
Ms Pallikaropoulus took part as the appellant. When she lost the case she 
was ordered to bear her own costs and pay the respondent’s litigation cost at 
approximately GBP 90 000, which she appealed to the British Supreme 
Court that asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  
 
To begin with, the CJEU underlined the fact that the requirement that costs 
should not be prohibitively expensive does not prevent national courts from 
making an order of costs.213 In that regard the Court made a reference to the 
Aarhus Convention, as this is explicitly expressed in its Article 3(8). 
 
The CJEU found, in essence, that the requirement that litigation should not 
be prohibitively expensive concerns all the costs relating to participation in 
the judicial proceedings and therefore the costs must be assessed as a whole, 
and include all the costs borne by the concerned party.214 Moreover, the 
CJEU affirmed that the assessment of what must be seen as prohibitively 
expensive is not solely a matter of national law due to the need for the 
uniform application of EU law, and the principle of equality, by taking the 
context and the purpose of the provision into account.215 As the objective of 
the EU legislature is to give the public wide access to justice, so they can 
play an active role in protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment, the requirement that cost shall not be prohibitively expensive 
relates to the fulfilment of the right to effective remedy enshrined in article 
47 of the Charter of fundamental rights.216 Furthermore, it relates to the 
principle of effectiveness, meaning detailed procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must not make 
it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred 
by EU law.217 The CJEU stated the requirement that judicial proceedings 
should not be prohibitively expensive means the persons covered by those 
                                                
213 Case C-260/11 Edwards and Pallikaropoulos (2013) supra note 150, para. 25, with 
reference to Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland (2009) para.92 
214 Case C-260/11 Edwards and Pallikaropoulos (2013) supra note 150, paras 27- 28 
215 Ibid., at paras 29-30 
216 Ibid., at para. 33 
217 See inter alia Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK (2011) supra note 106 
 44 
provisions should not be prevented from seeking, or pursuing claim for a 
review by the courts due to the financial burden this might cause.218  
 
Moreover, the CJEU stated it must be recalled that where EU law lacks 
precision Member States retrain a broad discretion, when transposing a 
directive, to ensure it is fully effective, concerning the choice of methods.219 
In order to assess the costs the CJEU proclaimed it is not enough to look at 
the financial situation of the person concerned, this must also be based on an 
objective analysis of the amount of the cost, as the cost of proceedings must 
not appear for the public as being objectively unreasonable.220 When 
deciding the figure, other factors relevant are the situation of the parties 
concerned, whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, the 
importance of what is at stake for the claimant and the protection of the 
environment, the complexity of relevant law and procedure, the “potentially 
frivolous nature of the claim” at its different stages and the existence of a 
national legal aid scheme or a cost of protection regime.221 Additionally, the 
CJEU found that the fact that the claimant has not been deterred from 
asserting the claim is not in itself sufficient to establish that the costs have 
not been prohibitively expensive for that person. Lastly, the CJEU added 
that the assessment of the costs cannot be conducted according to diverse 
criteria depending on whether it is made at the termination of a first-instance 
proceeding, an appeal or a second appeal.  
 
4.2.3 Commission v United Kingdom 
The Commission brought infringement proceedings against the United 
Kingdom claiming they had failed to fully transpose and correctly apply 
Article 3(7) and 4(4) of Directive 2003/35/EC on public participation, 
amending the EIA Directive respectively the IPPC Directive with regard to 
public participation and access to justice, and thereby not obliged to the rule 
that proceedings cannot be prohibitively expensive. The Commission 
claimed the potential financial costs of losing procedures might prevent 
NGOs and individuals from challenging public authorities’ decisions in 
environmental matters. 
 
In the United Kingdom, in the end of a case, a so called “protective cost 
orders” can be granted in order to limit the amount a public authority is able 
to recover, but the Commission argued the that the lack of clear rules for 
giving such orders, as well as its discretionary and unpredictable nature, is 
not in accordance with the Directive. Moreover, the national norm is still 
that the losing party pays the winner’s costs. In addition to this, the 
Commission was concerned that the national law, obliging applicants for 
interim measures and injunctions suspending work on projects, to provide a 
“cross undertaking in damages”, meaning they promise to pay damages if 
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the measure turns out to be unfounded, hinders potential applications to 
make such orders.  
 
To begin with, the CJEU underlined that according to settled case law the 
transposition of a directive does not necessarily require the provisions to be 
enacted in a specific, express provision of national law, instead it may be 
sufficient if it is laid down in a general legal context.222 The Court stressed 
that “where a relevant provision is designated to create rights for 
individuals, the legal situation must be sufficiently precise and clear, and the 
person concerned must be put in a position to know the full extent of their 
rights and, where appropriate, to be able to rely on them before the national 
courts.”223 Nevertheless, the CJEU stressed that not every judicial practice is 
uncertain and inherently incapable of meeting these requirements. 
Furthermore, with reference to the requirements laid down in Edwards and 
Pallikaropoulos,224 the Court stated that the discretion available to the 
national courts when applying the national costs regime is not in itself 
incompatible with the requirement that proceedings must not be 
prohibitively expensive, and the possibility for the court hearing a case of 
granting a protective costs order actually ensures greater predictability of the 
costs of the proceedings and contributes to compliance with that 
requirement.225 Nevertheless, the CJEU concluded that the mere fact there 
ought to be a comprehensive analysis and assess of the effect of a body of 
case law to determine whether national law meets the objectives of 
Directive 2003/35, while EU law confers on individuals’ specific rights that 
need to be unequivocal to be effective, suggests that the national 
transposition is not sufficient clear and precise.226 Moreover, the regime laid 
down by the national case law does not assure possible claimants reasonable 
predictability of the total amount of the proceedings, despite the fact that 
this is particularly necessary in a country like the United Kingdom where 
the costs of litigations are known to be high.227   
Regarding the cross-undertakings in respect of the grant of interim relief, 
the Court repeated its statement in Edwards and Pallikaropoulos that in 
order to determine if the costs are not prohibitively expensive within the 
meaning of the Directive, all financial costs must be assessed as a whole.228 
Moreover, the Court noted it follows from case law that a national court, in 
a dispute governed by EU law, must be able to grant interim relief to 
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guarantee the full effectiveness of the judgement to be given on rights 
claimed under EU-law, which includes EU environmental law.229 
Consequently, when a dispute falls within Directive 2003/35, amending the 
EIA Directive and the IPPC Directive, the requirement that proceedings are 
not to be prohibitively expensive is also applicable to costs arising from 
measures national courts might impose as a condition for granting interim 
measures.230 The CJEU, however, underlined that besides this fact, the 
conditions for such interim relief are in principle a matter for national law 
alone, as long as the principle of effectiveness and equivalence is observed. 
Thereby, the “not prohibitively expensive-rule” does not preclude the 
application of financial guarantees as such. Still, the national courts must 
make sure the resulting financial risk for the claimant is included in the total 
amounts of the proceedings when the court assesses whether the 
proceedings are prohibitively expensive.231 Thereby, the CJEU found the 
system of cross-undertakings in respect for the grant of interim relief to 
compose an additional element of uncertainty and imprecision regarding the 
costs of the proceedings.232 
Consequently, the Court held the United Kingdom had failed to correctly 
transpose Articles 3(7) and 4(4) of Directive 2003/35 regarding the 
requirement that proceedings must not be prohibitively expensive.  
4.2.4 Comment 
The previously presented case law is of significant importance regarding the 
interpretation of the scope and meaning of the rule, established by the 
Aarhus Convention, that the costs of environmental proceedings must not 
prohibitively expensive. In addition to this, the opinions delivered by the 
Advocate General Kokott in the three cases, also provide guidance, 
especially regarding the interaction between the Aarhus Convention and 
fundamental EU law in this matter.  
 
To begin with, as the Advocate General Kokott pointed out in her opinion in 
Edwards and Pallikaropoulos, the interpretation of the prevention of 
prohibitively expensive judicial proceedings can be derived from the 
wording of the provision, but also from its context, and therefore other 
articles of the Aarhus Convention should be taken into account. In addition 
to this, the general requirements governing the transposition and 
implementation of EU law are significant, such as the need for sufficiently 
clear transposition, the principle of effectiveness and equivalence, and 
fundamental rights under EU law.233 Furthermore, she pointed out that the 
discretion of the EU Member States regarding the implementation of these 
provisions is particularly broad since they “do not contain any further rules 
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on how prohibitively costs are specifically to be prevented”.234 She 
underlined the fact that the great diversity of cost regimes in the Member 
States highlights the need for that discretion, and neither Article 9(4) of the 
Convention, nor the Directives implementing it, are intended to 
comprehensively harmonize these systems, instead they only require 
necessary adaptions.235 Despite this fact, she continued, the discretion 
enjoyed by the Member States is not unlimited, as they are responsible for 
ensuring that the rights stemming from EU law are effectively protected in 
each case and therefore the Member States’ rules must ensure in each 
individual case that the costs of the judicial proceedings are not 
prohibitively expensive.236 Still, according to the study made on the 
implementation of Article 9(3) and 9(4) in the EU Member States, the costs 
of judicial procedures are believed to have a “clear chilling effect” to access 
to justice in environmental matters in several of the examined legal 
systems.237 Actually, there are Member States where the costs even might 
constitute an obstacle.238 The main issues relate to high court fees, the 
mandatory use of attorneys in court in combination with high lawyers’ fees, 
expenses for expert witnesses and high bonds for obtaining injunctive relief, 
and the loser pays principle in relation to cost liability for the lawyers of the 
operator and/or authorities.239 In particular, the uncertainties concerning the 
costs are found to be a barrier to the willingness to challenge administrative 
decisions in environmental matters.240  
 
In Commission v Ireland the CJEU ruled that a judicial practice under which 
the Courts simply have the power do decline to order an unsuccessful party 
to pay the costs and can order expenditure incurred by the unsuccessful 
party to be borne by the other party, is by definition uncertain and therefore 
does not meet the requirements of clarity and precision needed to be seen as 
a valid implementation of the obligations laid down in Directive 2003/35, 
relating to the not prohibitively expensive requirement.241 Moreover, as 
Advocate General Kokott pointed out in her opinion of the case, Article 9(5) 
of the Aarhus Convention stating that ”each Party shall ensure that 
information is provided to the public on access to administrative and judicial 
review procedures and shall consider the establishment of appropriate 
assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other barriers to 
access to justice” must, regardless of any express mention in Directive 
2003/35, be taken into account when interpreting Article 9(4) of the 
Convention, and the provisions in the Directives designed to reflect it.242 
Furthermore, Advocate General Kokott found that Article 47 of the Charter 
of fundamental rights, requiring legal aid to be granted in so far as such aid 
is necessary to ensure access to justice, as it by that time did not have legal 
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effect comparable of that of primary law, should serve as a source of legal 
guidance.243 
 
In Edwards and Pallikaropoulos the CJEU delivered further clarification of 
the meaning of the not prohibitively expensive rule, by stating that it does 
not prevent the national courts from making an order for costs in judicial 
proceedings provided the amount is reasonable, and that the whole costs are 
taken into account when assessing whether they are not prohibitively 
expensive.244 Moreover, the both the interest of the person seeking to defend 
his/her rights and the public interest in the protection of the environment 
must be taken into account.245 Of most importance, as the Advocate General 
stated in her opinion, “the proceedings may not be so expensive that the 
costs threaten to prevent them from being conducted”.246 In that remark she 
underlined that it is significant that provisions of the Aarhus Convention on 
judicial proceedings are interpreted in the light of the aim to ensure “wide 
access to justice”. Even though “wide access to justice” is only expressively 
mentioned in Article 9(2), Advocate General Kokott emphasized it is clear 
that this is a general objective of the Convention, and must therefore be 
applied while examining what constitutes permissible costs of the 
proceedings. 
 
Lastly, in Commission v United Kingdom the CJEU provided further 
guidance concerning costs and interim relief measures in environmental 
cases.247 As Advocate General Kokott put it; the ruling in Edwards and 
Pallikaropoulos was of significant importance when examining the 
circumstances of the case. The CJEU as well, relied both on the 
requirements laid down in the Edwards Case, and also referred to what had 
been established in the Commission v Ireland Case, when examining if the 
United Kingdom had fully transposed and correctly applied the rule that 
environmental proceedings must not be prohibitively expensive. The Court 
found, in essence, that the British regime laid down by the case law did not 
assure possible claimants reasonable predictability of the costs of the 
proceedings, and regarding the cross-undertakings in respect for the grant of 
interim relief, the Court underlined all financial costs must be assessed as a 
whole. 
In conclusion, the judgements delivered by the Court concerning the costs 
of environmental proceedings, are of significant importance as the costs 
might compose a hinder to access to justice in environmental matters. 
Through these judgements the Court outlined several conditions they found 
to be embedded in the requirement that proceedings must not be 
prohibitively expensive, and clarified the meaning of the EU 
implementation of Article 9(4) and 9(5) of the Aarhus Convention. 
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4.3 Concluding remarks 
The main outcome of this case law is that the allowed national standing 
requirements for environmental NGOs and costs of the proceedings, in the 
light of the Aarhus Convention and the relevant EU legislation, have been 
clarified. Moreover, the CJEU has broadened access to justice for 
environmental NGOs in several Member States. Lastly, it should be 
mentioned that since the case law from the CJEU shows the right to access 
the EU Courts in order to challenge decisions of EU institutions is very 
limited, especially for environmental NGOs, it has been suggested, 
originally from the Court itself, 248 that a more plausible route to question 
the validity of EU law could be made through national courts via their 
request for a preliminary ruling.249 Thereby, the broadened access to the 
national courts, established by this case law, might increase this 
possibility.250  
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5 Analysis 
The EU and the Member States’ implementation of, and compliance with, 
the Aarhus Convention have not been unproblematic. In fact, there have 
been several legal ambiguities both regarding the EU legal order and the 
internal legal order of several EU Member States.251 For example, as part of 
the implementation of the Aarhus Convention, examined in chapter two, the 
Commission made a proposal for a Directive on access to justice in 
environmental matters, but the Member States opposed this suggestion due 
to the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, access to justice in 
environmental matters still varies throughout the Union, and in several 
Member States there are a number of barriers potential applicants have to 
overcome.252 Thereby, the judgements delivered by the CJEU on access to 
justice in environmental matters at EU Member State level are of particular 
importance, especially considering the progressive approach taken by the 
Court. The main focus of this thesis has been put on the part of this case law 
addressing national standing requirements for environmental NGOs as well 
as the costs of the environmental proceedings, in the light of the Aarhus 
Convention and the relevant EU legislation.  
 
It is clear from the previous presentation that the CJEU has played an 
important role concerning the interpretation of access to the EU Member 
States courts in environmental matters. First it should be noted that the 
Court has not solely relied on the Aarhus Convention, and the EU 
implementation of it, instead the reasoning of the Court is also based on the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law, the right to effective judicial 
protection, as well as Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights.253 In 
that remark, the judgements delivered by the Court, for instance the 
judgement in Trianel, have resulted in a growing influence of the Aarhus 
Convention in the EU Member States, partly due to an excessive 
interpretation of the principle of effectiveness.254 Thereby, the rulings of the 
CJEU in this aspect are bound to have a significant outcome for the Member 
States. For instance in Sweden, the national courts’ interpretation of this 
case law, through the application of the principle of effectiveness along with 
the implementation of the Aarhus Convention has resulted in significant 
changes of Swedish procedural law, including areas that fall outside the 
scope of the national environmental legislation.255  
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The main outcome of the studied case law from the CJEU is the widened 
access to the EU Member State Courts. Before returning to the analysis of 
these judgements there will be an examination of the arguments put 
forward, both on the political level and in the doctrine, to broaden the access 
to justice in environmental matters at EU Member State level. As stated in 
the introduction, the general reasons why enforcing access to justice in 
environmental matters are; it may add to the protection of public 
environmental interests, enforce the implementation of existing 
environmental laws, and increase the legitimacy of environmental 
decisions.256 Moreover, as the environment has no voice of its own, in order 
to enforce the protection of it, for instance environmental NGOs must be 
able to speak on behalf of it.257 
 
According to the Commission, the main reason why EU environmental law 
is less fully enforced compared to laws concerning for instance the internal 
market, is the lack of financial motivation in these cases.258 In addition, 
these variations between the Member States, and the irregular enforcement 
of EU environmental law, may distort the functioning of the internal market, 
as this give economic operators in Member States that do not comply with 
their obligations an economic advantage over those that respect the 
environmental legislation.259 Also, the potential costs of the lack of 
enforcement should be taken into account. Thereby, there are also economic 
incitements to broaden access to justice in environmental matters in the EU 
Member States. Consequently, increasing for instance the ability of 
environmental NGOs to have access to court, relying on infringement or 
lack of enforcement of EU environmental law, would not only serve the 
purpose to protect the environment as such.  
 
In the judgements delivered by the CJEU, the role of NGOs in 
environmental protection has been highlighted, even though not to the same 
extent as in the opinions delivered by Advocate General Sharpston. 
Nevertheless, it is clear the Court has facilitated access to justice for 
environmental NGOs in the EU Member State. Thereby, the question arises 
what consequences this will lead to for the Member States? It has been 
argued that broad access to justice in environmental matters could risk 
overloading the courts, but this has showed not to bee the case in the EU 
Member States where the legislation has been changed in order to allow 
wider access.260 Additionally, broad access to justice for environmental 
NGOS can actually increase the efficiency of the procedures, as these 
organisations both may filter the number of applicants and provide with 
expert knowledge in the environmental field.261 Moreover, the European 
Commission has acknowledged that the practical experience gained from 
granting legal standing for environmental NGOs indicates that this improves 
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the implementation of environmental law.262 The judgements delivered by 
the CJEU on access to the EU Member States courts for environmental 
NGOs, and in particular the opinions delivered by the Advocate General, are 
well in line with this reasoning. Thereby, through the CJEU’s interpretation 
of the national standing requirements environmental NGOs access to the 
national courts has been broadened and facilitated. As Advocate General 
Sharpston put it in Djurgaarden; wide access to justice for environmental 
NGOs could ensure the representation of public interest with a high level of 
technical specialisation, and give the environment the voice it needs.263  
 
As the costs of the proceedings might constitute an indirect hinder to access 
to justice in environmental matters, the CJEU’s judgements clarifying the 
rule that costs must not be prohibitively expensive might have a significant 
effect on the accessibility to the EU Member State courts, especially in 
systems where the legal fees tend to be high. Thereby, I believe these 
judgements to have an impact on environmental NGOs ability to take action 
in court, especially for the smaller, local organisations with limited 
resources. As a result, these judgements, in combination with the outcome 
in the Djurgaarden case where the importance of local NGOs was 
highlighted, the smaller environmental NGOs possibilities to have an 
influence on environmental matters have increased. Consequently, their 
competence to enforce environmental protection, through the national 
courts, at the local level is enhanced. Moreover, as these cases Commission 
v Ireland and Commission v United Kingdom, concern the so far only 
judicial outcome of the Commissions infringement proceedings against 
Member Sates for failing to oblige to their obligation originating from the 
Aarhus Convention’s provisions on access to justice in environmental 
matters, they are significant in order to put focus on these issues. Moreover, 
these cases indicate the Commission monitors this legal area and thereby the 
Member States’ obligation to adjust both to the EU legislation, and the 
corresponding case law from the CJEU, is highlighted.  
 
The last question to answer is if there is a need of further clarification from 
the CJEU, or harmonizing measures from the EU legislator. According to 
the 7th EAP, that set up to ensure that “the principle of effective legal 
protection for citizen and their organizations is facilitated,”264 the 
maximisation of the benefits of EU environmental legislation can only be 
achieved if the national provisions on access to justice in environmental 
matter reflect the case law of the CJEU.265 To begin with, it should be 
underlined that the EU Directives put in place to implement the provisions 
of the Aarhus Convention, do not cover all aspects of the Convention. 
Access to justice regarding public participation in decision-making, 
                                                
262 COM(2003) 624 final, supra note 22 at Explanatory Memorandum 3.1 
263 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 2 July 2009 in Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla 
Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v Stockholms kommun genom dess marknämnd para. 61  
264 Decision 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 November 
2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 “Living well, within the 
limits of our planet” OJ L 354, 28/12/2013, point 65(e) 
265 Ibid., at point 65(v) 
 53 
established through Directive 2003/35, only applies to situations covered by 
the EIA and the IPPC Directive. Above all, Article 9(3) of the Convention 
regarding access to justice to challenge acts and omissions by private 
persons and public authorities which violate provisions of national law 
relating to the environment, has not yet been implemented by any directive. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the broad access to justice contained in 
the proposed directive on access to justice in environmental matters, which 
the Member States opposed, seems to be realized to a certain extent through 
the case law developed by the CJEU, in particular due to the judgement in 
the Slovak Brown Bear case.266 Still, this will not ensure the full application 
of Article 9(3) of the Convention in all Member States, due to the fact that 
such Arhus-conform interpretation of national law depends both on the 
wording of the national law in question as well as the national doctrine on 
conform interpretation of international law.267 Moreover, to await for the 
Member State to adjust to the case law from the CJEU will be too time 
consuming and uncertain.268 In that remark, it should be remembered, as 
noted above, that there are still ambiguities regarding the right to access to 
justice at EU Member State level for environmental NGOs. Furthermore, as 
stated in the proposed Directive on access to justice, “environmental law 
will only produce the desired effects if its enforcement is possible 
throughout the Union”.269 Consequently, in order to level the playing field 
and achieve legal certainty, the conclusion drawn in this thesis, based on the 
analysis of the examined case law as well as arguments put forward both in 
the doctrine and studies on this matter, is that there is a need of further 
clarification from the CJEU, or preferably, legislative measures taken at 
Union level.270   
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6 Conclusion 
Already in the Rio Declaration it was proclaimed that an informed and 
active society could play a crucial role in the preservation of the 
environment.271 This acknowledgement later became the foundation of the 
UNECE’s Convention on access to information, participation in decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental matters. The focus on this 
thesis has been put on what is said to be the most controversial part of the 
Convention, and the EU legislation implementing it, namely access to 
justice in environmental matters.272  
 
It is beyond doubt the CJEU has played a key role when it comes to the 
interpretation of the Aarhus Convention, and the EU implementation of it. 
The presented judgements have had significant effect on access to court in 
the EU Member States. To begin with, when the CJEU’s interpreted the 
national standing requirements for environmental NGOs the Court 
highlighted the important role of these organisations as well as the objective 
of the Aarhus Convention to grant NGOs wide access to justice in 
environmental matters. Furthermore, as the costs of environmental 
proceedings might constitute an indirect hinder to access to justice, the 
CJEU has concluded that the costs must be examined in the light of the 
objective of the Aarhus Convention to establish wide access to justice in 
environmental matter. Consequently, these judgements may increase the 
ability for both individuals and environmental organisations to take action in 
court. 
 
Nevertheless, there are still issues regarding the right to access to justice in 
environmental matters that need to be resolved.273 In order to enforce EU 
environmental legislation and achieve legal certainty throughout the Union, 
the conclusion drawn in this thesis, based on the analysis of the examined 
case law as well as arguments put forward both in the doctrine274 and in 
studies ordered by the Commission in order to investigate this subject,275 is 
that there should be measures taken by the EU legislator. What approaches 
the EU legislator will take, whether deciding to take action and outline a 
Directive on access to justice in environmental matter, or leave it up to the 
CJEU to continue to clarify this legal area, remains to be seen. 
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